SPIR STAR Asia was listed on 13 February 2026 by the dragonforce ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). dragonforce listed 37 organizations that month and 666 in total.
- Listed 278 days ago.
- 802 organizations were listed by all groups in February 2026, see the month.
- 156 in Manufacturing that month.
- 5 in SG that month.
Updated 2026-11-19 05:51 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
SPIR STAR Asia
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Dragonforce 666 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
The group's leak-site address is on paid plans
Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
Headquartered in Mörlenbach, Germany, SPIR STAR designs and manufactures a wide range of thermoplastic high pressure hoses for working pressures up to 3200 bar (46400 psi). The production of high pressure hoses was started in 1981 by PAPUREX in Mörlenbach with SPIR STAR being the brand name of the product. In 1989 SPIR STAR Druckschläuche GmbH was founded by the owners of PAPUREX. In 1991 SPIR STAR France S.A.R.L in Haguenau/France and in 1995 SPIR STAR Inc. in Houston/Texas were founded in order to promote SPIR STAR's products and develop the market. In 1999 SPIR STAR Asia in Singapore was founded. SPIR STAR hoses are constructed with spiral layers of specially treated, highly tensile steel wire. The inner core is made of Polyoxymethylene (POM) or Polyamide (PA) while the outer cover is either of Polyamide or Polyurethane (PUR).
Plain-English summary AI-written
The group says it holds information about SPIR STAR, including its high-pressure hose products and company history.
Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with SPIR STAR Asia (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask SPIR STAR Asia directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what SPIR STAR Asia can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching SPIR STAR Asia A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are SPIR STAR Asia
Within 3 days
- Find out what was actually taken The post names no specific kind of data, so no data-specific steps are shown. Check the group's own post and your logs to learn what is claimed and what is real. Why: The listing text names no data types.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties Singapore: PDPA breach notification to the PDPC, generally within 3 calendar days of assessing a breach as notifiable. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: Singapore.
Within 30 days
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Manufacturing organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: dragonforce listed 6 other Manufacturing organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
69/100 • ELEVATEDA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
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