Dallas Theological Seminary was listed on 20 November 2026 by the Barracuda ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). Barracuda listed 5 organizations that month and 19 in total.
- Listed 0 days ago.
- 984 organizations were listed by all groups in November 2026, see the month.
- 37 in Education that month.
- 433 in US that month.
Updated 2026-11-20 12:29 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
Dallas Theological Seminary
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Barracuda 19 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
The group's leak-site address is on paid plans
Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
A security audit at Dallas Theological Seminary (DTS) identified critical infrastructure vulnerabilities that led to a complete compromise. 519 GB of sensitive data was stolen. The organization refused to cooperate, endangering its employees and students, essentially approving our leak of their files when there was an opportunity to resolve the incident and avoid it. Organization do not care about the data of their employees and customers, they do not want to resolve the incident, and vulnerabilities in their infrastructure remain open, which will lead to another leak in the future. Published for free. | FREE
Amounts as written
- 519 GB
Kinds of data mentioned
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Accounting and ledgers
“A security audit at Dallas Theological Seminary (DTS) identified critical infrastructure vulnerabilities that…”
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Customer or client data
“…stolen. The organization refused to cooperate, endangering its employees and students, essentially approving our leak of their files when there was an opportunity to resolve the…”
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Employee and HR records
“…data was stolen. The organization refused to cooperate, endangering its employees and students, essentially approving our leak of their files when there was an opportunity…”
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with Dallas Theological Seminary (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask Dallas Theological Seminary directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what Dallas Theological Seminary can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data, employee and hr records.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: accounting and ledgers.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching Dallas Theological Seminary A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are Dallas Theological Seminary
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: customer or client data.
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: accounting and ledgers.
Within 3 days
- Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: employee and hr records.
- Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 519 GB. Treat group figures as unverified.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties United States: state breach-notification laws apply; listed companies may also have SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 duties for material incidents, and HIPAA applies to health data. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: United States.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
60/100 • ELEVATEDA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceNo scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.
Open the full attack surface scan →Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.