Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift
Dashboard / Victims / Gamdom V2

Gamdom V2 was listed on 31 October 2026 by the Whitearmor ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). Whitearmor listed 19 organizations that month and 25 in total.

  • Listed 18 days ago.
  • 1147 organizations were listed by all groups in October 2026, see the month.
  • 23 in Hospitality that month.

Updated 2026-11-18 11:12 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.

Gamdom V2 corporate emblem
Listed by Whitearmor Disclosed: 2026-10-31 10:30 UTC

Gamdom V2

Hospitality

Threat Group Post & Evidence

Listed by
Whitearmor 25 listings in total

The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.

No capture of the original post

We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.

The group's leak-site address is on paid plans

Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.

What the group says it holds

Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.

An Insight into Gamdom's Lies We have given Gamdom multiple chances to communicate, to no avail. They didn't even try to see how much data I have on the people, and have already decided that they will not pay the amount. What does this mean? - The 15.4 million entries will be leaked in the same format as below. - The Perabet data (userid | email | password) will also be leaked along with the Gamdom leak. See sample for the format. - All support chats and photos shared in the support chat are in my possession; see the samples below. - The lies within Gamdom's Provably Fair, part 1 is being leaked today, and part 2 when they choose not to pay (with reproducible evidence). A larger data sample of the original breach will also be attached, since some people are doubting the severity of this case. FELIX ROEMER — Founder - Admin uid 16259643 "Felix aka Howly" · last IP 13.250.207.55 (Aug 19) ·…
Show the full post (4288 characters)

An Insight into Gamdom's Lies We have given Gamdom multiple chances to communicate, to no avail. They didn't even try to see how much data I have on the people, and have already decided that they will not pay the amount. What does this mean? - The 15.4 million entries will be leaked in the same format as below. - The Perabet data (userid | email | password) will also be leaked along with the Gamdom leak. See sample for the format. - All support chats and photos shared in the support chat are in my possession; see the samples below. - The lies within Gamdom's Provably Fair, part 1 is being leaked today, and part 2 when they choose not to pay (with reproducible evidence). A larger data sample of the original breach will also be attached, since some people are doubting the severity of this case. FELIX ROEMER — Founder - Admin uid 16259643 "Felix aka Howly" · last IP 13.250.207.55 (Aug 19) · net +859,966,343 sats - Legacy supadm uid 3356423 - PHONE +49175804570 - Personal player uid 48242366 ("Felix Roemer", [email protected], same phone) +49175804570 He changed his number 24 hours ago, as a result of this breach. This was his main number prior. PF: What their own code actually shows: 1. The crash game has no player seed. Provably fair normally means you add your own seed and results are computed from your seed plus theirs. In Gamdom's crash game the seed is one fixed constant hardcoded into the game file. It is the same for every player, every round, forever. Nothing about a round depends on you, and the house can know every upcoming result before anyone places a bet. 2. The crash formula carries a hidden house cut. The math in their code includes a term (a divide by 50) that is not part of the fair formula they describe publicly. There is also a built-in 1 in 100 chance that every round instantly crashes at 1.00x. Running their own formula, the real average return to players is about 97.8 percent, and it gets worse depending on where you cash out. 3. The payout rate is a live setting, not a fixed rule. Admins can change the house edge from a control panel, and the change even overrides the payout rate advertised by game providers. A game can be listed at one payout number and quietly repriced later. 4. For roulette and hilo, their own code comment admits the result mapping is "slightly biased because of modulo." They knew and wrote it down. 5. For dice, the player's seed is never saved to the database, so the "verify your result" feature cannot actually be used after the round. 6. The code also lets the system cut a crash round short and force-cash everyone out when total payouts hit a cap calculated from the live bets on the table. TL;DR: The help page promises "the server seed is secret until reveal, nobody, the house included, can know your next result". Reality: the database stored the raw seed next to the hash, the crash game shipped with a fixed public seed so the house could see every result in advance, and the house edge was a runtime dial. That is not provably fair. That is trust-me with extra steps. The live crash game file at gamdom.com/build/Crash.route.BBLHNSNC.js contains the fixed seed and the formula. Download it and read it yourself. Perabet serves the same file on perabet.com with only the logo changed. <- which they might have changed after I called them out, but I hold artifacts from 13 October. This means they had been running unfairly, while knowing the outcome of EVERY roll/bet (besides Live Casino) from 2016 until October 2026. Finding: 51 dice rolls across 3 accounts, plus 18 and 16 rolls on 2 more, every outcome predicted correctly before the round finished; any staff member with read access can see the same data and act on it. Sample of their own code attached. All arti Originals from the live system, captured and SHA-256 sealed at the time, independently recomputable by anyone. Changes made now cannot rewrite a timestamped capture, they only add to the record. The full evidence package goes to independent journalists and researchers for re-verification. Maybe all of this is the reason why out of the ~16 million entries only 199 users (with around 30% being streamers/staff members) have realized a net profit of 1 BTC+ This is your last chance to reach out to us, Gamdom.

Amounts as written

  • 3 accounts

Kinds of data mentioned

  • Passwords and credentials

    “…be leaked in the same format as below. - The Perabet data (userid email password) will also be leaked along with the Gamdom leak. See sample for the format. - All support…”

  • Email and communications

    “…will be leaked in the same format as below. - The Perabet data (userid email password) will also be leaked along with the Gamdom leak. See sample for the format. - All…”

  • Customer or client data

    “…every outcome predicted correctly before the round finished; any staff member with read access can see the same data and act on it. Sample of their own code attached. All…”

  • Employee and HR records

    “…more, every outcome predicted correctly before the round finished; any staff member with read access can see the same data and act on it. Sample of their own code attached.…”

  • Databases and backups

    “…and wrote it down. 5. For dice, the player's seed is never saved to the database, so the "verify your result" feature cannot actually be used after the round. 6. The code…”

What to do about this listing

Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.

If you work with Gamdom V2 (customer, supplier or partner)

Within 3 days

  • Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
  • Ask Gamdom V2 directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
  • Review what Gamdom V2 can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
  • Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data, email and communications, passwords and credentials, employee and hr records.
  • Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: databases and backups.

Within 30 days

  • Keep watching Gamdom V2 A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are Gamdom V2

First 24 hours

  • Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials, email and communications, customer or client data.

Within 3 days

  • Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: employee and hr records.
  • Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
  • Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
  • Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 3 accounts. Treat group figures as unverified.
  • Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties No country is recorded for this listing. Identify the data-protection and contractual duties that apply where the affected people live, and ask counsel. General guidance, not legal advice. Why: The listing records no country.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
  • Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.

Listing details

Resolved Domain Not stated
Industry Vertical Hospitality
Country Not stated
Enrichment Status ENRICHED

Listing severity score (heuristic)

72/100 • ELEVATED

A heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.

1. Sector Criticality 30/30 pts
Healthcare and life sciences
2. Group tier 10/25 pts
Tier 3: all other groups
3. Data Volume & PII Scope 18/25 pts
Larger claim: gigabytes, or business or financial records named in the post
Formula: sector • group tier • data claimed (scaled to 100) Rule-based score

External Attack Surface Profile

ASM Intelligence

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