winfashion was listed on 24 August 2026 by the dragonforce ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). dragonforce listed 15 organizations that month and 666 in total.
- Listed 86 days ago.
- 1198 organizations were listed by all groups in August 2026, see the month.
- 80 in Retail & E-Commerce that month.
- 1 other listing for the same organization.
Updated 2026-11-14 15:59 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
Named in 2 separate listings
Another listing name this organization: a different group, or the same group months apart. Each is a claim the group published, not a confirmed breach. The same group listing it again within a few months is not counted: that is the same listing sent twice or moved from countdown to published.
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Dragonforce 666 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
The group's leak-site address is on paid plans
Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ WINFASHION TECHNOLOGIES DUMP: DATA LEAK ANALYSIS OF A B2B ERP PLATFORM FOR THE FASHION INDUSTRY ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ This is a preliminary analysis, processing of sensitive data is currently underway. Target: WinFashion Technologies (Los Angeles, USA) — an international B2B provider of ERP solutions (WF125sR / Fabric ERP V.10) for 250+ fashion brands. Offices in New York, Shanghai, and India. Integrations: Shopify, Acenda, JOOR, NuORDER, CommerceHub, FashionGo. BPO/EDI processing via Inovis/QRS. DUMP VOLUME: ~205K files / ~13K directories / ~73 Gigabytes AT-RISK FILES: 125,274 (61.0%) Critical: 9,350 High: 78,174 Medium: 37,750 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: ▸ kaktus.bak (5.64 GB) — full MSSQL backup of the "Kaktus" client's ERP installation (Customer Master…
Show the full post (2785 characters)
══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ WINFASHION TECHNOLOGIES DUMP: DATA LEAK ANALYSIS OF A B2B ERP PLATFORM FOR THE FASHION INDUSTRY ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ This is a preliminary analysis, processing of sensitive data is currently underway. Target: WinFashion Technologies (Los Angeles, USA) — an international B2B provider of ERP solutions (WF125sR / Fabric ERP V.10) for 250+ fashion brands. Offices in New York, Shanghai, and India. Integrations: Shopify, Acenda, JOOR, NuORDER, CommerceHub, FashionGo. BPO/EDI processing via Inovis/QRS. DUMP VOLUME: ~205K files / ~13K directories / ~73 Gigabytes AT-RISK FILES: 125,274 (61.0%) Critical: 9,350 High: 78,174 Medium: 37,750 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: ▸ kaktus.bak (5.64 GB) — full MSSQL backup of the "Kaktus" client's ERP installation (Customer Master, Style Master, EDI, AR) ▸ 6 SSL PFX containers + EDI-VAN client certificate for ECGrid/OpenText ▸ 33,307 .shxml files — WinSCP SFTP session logs (hosts, paths, sizes) ▸ 332 ASP.NET Web.config files — potentially hardcoded Shopify / Authorize.Net secrets ▸ 171 files with PAN / CreditCard / Cardholder / Payment data — Authorize.Net payment processing code ▸ 39 files with IBAN / SWIFT / BankAccount data — bank account details ▸ 259 Invoice Register / Invoice data files — Excel payment registers (up to 124 MB) CLIENT DATA (~40 BRANDS): ▸ STYLEMASTER.xlsx (48 MB) — aggregated product catalog export ▸ Vendors.XLS (20 MB) + test customers.XLS (7 MB) — Kaktus vendors and customers ▸ 40,621 EDI files (.edi / .850 / .856 / .810 / .997 / .852 / .832 / .846) — full B2B trade lifecycle (PO, ASN, invoices, price catalogs) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ▸ 8,577 .cs files — integration source code (Authorize.Net, Shopify, Acenda, JOOR, NuORDER, DSCO) ▸ 5,828 .pbd files — PowerBuilder WF125sR ERP core ▸ 3,398 .sql files — DB schema, triggers, CLR procedures ▸ 18 .dbf / .mdf files — legacy DBASE / FOXPRO / MSSQL tables without encryption HR / PII: ▸ INV EMPLOYEE ALLOWANCE YTD.xlsx (76 MB) — employee HR data ▸ AR Aging 12.30.25.xls + AR Aging 12.29.25.XLS — accounts receivable for Monrow and Kaktus clients REGULATORY RISKS: ▸ PCI DSS — compromise of PAN processing code + Authorize Excel registers ▸ CCPA / CPRA — HR-PII (76 MB), California jurisdiction ▸ FTC — "total security" claims amidst PFX / DBF / Web.config compromise ▸ SEC (Regulation FD) — risk for publicly traded client issuers ▸ GDPR — PII of customers / vendors across ~40 brands The dump represents a cross-tenant B2B SaaS incident involving the disclosure of trade secrets for ~40 fashion brands, the compromise of the Authorize.Net payment infrastructure, and the exposure of the full ERP source code.
Amounts as written
- 205K files
- 73 Gigabytes
- 5.64 GB
- 171 files
- 39 files
- 124 MB
- 48 MB
- 20 MB
Kinds of data mentioned
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Accounting and ledgers
“…files with IBAN / SWIFT / BankAccount data — bank account details ▸ 259 Invoice Register / Invoice data files — Excel payment registers (up to 124 MB) CLIENT DATA (~40 BRANDS):…”
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Banking and wire details
“…/ Payment data — Authorize.Net payment processing code ▸ 39 files with IBAN / SWIFT / BankAccount data — bank account details ▸ 259 Invoice Register / Invoice data files…”
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Customer or client data
“…PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: ▸ kaktus.bak (5.64 GB) — full MSSQL backup of the "Kaktus" client's ERP installation (Customer Master, Style Master, EDI, AR) ▸ 6 SSL PFX containers + EDI-VAN…”
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Employee and HR records
“…legacy DBASE / FOXPRO / MSSQL tables without encryption HR / PII: ▸ INV EMPLOYEE ALLOWANCE YTD.xlsx (76 MB) — employee HR data ▸ AR Aging 12.30.25.xls + AR Aging 12.29.25.XLS…”
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Source code and designs
“…/ .846) — full B2B trade lifecycle (PO, ASN, invoices, price catalogs) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ▸ 8,577 .cs files — integration source code (Authorize.Net, Shopify, Acenda, JOOR, NuORDER,…”
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Databases and backups
“…══════════════════════════ ══════════════════════════ WINFASHION TECHNOLOGIES DUMP: DATA LEAK ANALYSIS OF A B2B ERP PLATFORM FOR THE FASHION INDUSTRY ══════════════════════════…”
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with winfashion (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask winfashion directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what winfashion can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data, employee and hr records.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, accounting and ledgers.
- Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: source code and designs, databases and backups.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching winfashion A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are winfashion
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: customer or client data.
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, accounting and ledgers.
Within 3 days
- Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: employee and hr records.
- Rotate secrets and signing keys Assume secrets in repositories are exposed: rotate API keys, tokens and code-signing keys, and review build and release systems for unexpected changes. Why: The post names: source code and designs.
- Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
- Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 205K files, 73 Gigabytes, 5.64 GB. Treat group figures as unverified.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties No country is recorded for this listing. Identify the data-protection and contractual duties that apply where the affected people live, and ask counsel. General guidance, not legal advice. Why: The listing records no country.
Within 30 days
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Retail & E-Commerce organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: dragonforce listed 2 other Retail & E-Commerce organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
66/100 • ELEVATEDA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
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