Diamond Truck Centres was listed on 16 June 2026 by the aurora ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). aurora listed 11 organizations that month and 61 in total.
- Listed 156 days ago.
- 708 organizations were listed by all groups in June 2026, see the month.
- 26 in Transportation that month.
- 20 in CA that month.
Updated 2026-11-19 05:42 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
Diamond Truck Centres
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Aurora 61 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
The group's leak-site address is on paid plans
Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
[dealership, trucks] *** — Western Canada's largest International Trucks dealership group (9 dealer + 13 sub-dealer locations, ~$63M revenue, 250 employees). The dataset spans 17 years of unbroken operational history (2009–2026) and represents the full shared-drive contents of the entire company: HR, payroll, accounting, military contracts, and individual employee profiles. The exposed material includes: 53 customer Pre-Authorized Debit (PAD) forms — full bank account numbers, transit numbers, institution numbers, and authorized signatures for commercial customers including the City of Saskatoon. 17 years of employee payroll data — wages, SINs (implied), pension contributions, benefits, termination calculations for every employee since 2009. Biometric data — ADP fingerprint timeclock enrollment records for all locations. Immigration documents for 6+ foreign workers — LMIA applications, o…
Show the full post (1465 characters)
[dealership, trucks] *** — Western Canada's largest International Trucks dealership group (9 dealer + 13 sub-dealer locations, ~$63M revenue, 250 employees). The dataset spans 17 years of unbroken operational history (2009–2026) and represents the full shared-drive contents of the entire company: HR, payroll, accounting, military contracts, and individual employee profiles. The exposed material includes: 53 customer Pre-Authorized Debit (PAD) forms — full bank account numbers, transit numbers, institution numbers, and authorized signatures for commercial customers including the City of Saskatoon. 17 years of employee payroll data — wages, SINs (implied), pension contributions, benefits, termination calculations for every employee since 2009. Biometric data — ADP fingerprint timeclock enrollment records for all locations. Immigration documents for 6+ foreign workers — LMIA applications, offers of employment, provincial nominee support docs. System credentials in plaintext — ADP timeclock passwords, manager training logins, safe combination. Military contract documentation — Diamond's Controlled Goods Security Plan (ITAR/CGP), MSVS delivery matrices, military vehicle VINs, CFB Edmonton and RCMP vehicle program data. 289 GB of daily bank deposit scans (2017–2026) — customer cheque images with names, amounts, and account details. A complete Outlook PST archive (166 MB) — years of internal email likely containing credentials and customer data.
Amounts as written
- 250 employees
- 53 customer
- 289 GB
- 166 MB
Kinds of data mentioned
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Banking and wire details
“…material includes: 53 customer Pre-Authorized Debit (PAD) forms — full bank account numbers, transit numbers, institution numbers, and authorized signatures for commercial customers…”
-
Payroll and salaries
“…commercial customers including the City of Saskatoon. 17 years of employee payroll data — wages, SINs (implied), pension contributions, benefits, termination calculations for…”
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Passwords and credentials
“…applications, offers of employment, provincial nominee support docs. System credentials in plaintext — ADP timeclock passwords, manager training logins, safe combination. Military…”
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Email and communications
“…cheque images with names, amounts, and account details. A complete Outlook PST archive (166 MB) — years of internal email likely containing credentials and customer data.”
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Customer or client data
“The exposed material includes: 53 customer Pre-Authorized Debit (PAD) forms — full bank account numbers, transit numbers, institution…”
-
Employee and HR records
“…for commercial customers including the City of Saskatoon. 17 years of employee payroll data — wages, SINs (implied), pension contributions, benefits, termination calculations…”
-
Contracts and legal files
“…timeclock passwords, manager training logins, safe combination. Military contract documentation — Diamond's Controlled Goods Security Plan (ITAR/CGP), MSVS delivery matrices,…”
Plain-English summary AI-written
The group says it holds company shared-drive data, including human resources, payroll, accounting, military contracts, employee profiles, customer payment forms and employee payroll records.
Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with Diamond Truck Centres (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask Diamond Truck Centres directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what Diamond Truck Centres can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data, email and communications, passwords and credentials, employee and hr records.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, payroll and salaries.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching Diamond Truck Centres A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are Diamond Truck Centres
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials, email and communications, customer or client data, payroll and salaries.
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, payroll and salaries.
Within 3 days
- Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: employee and hr records.
- Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 250 employees, 53 customer, 289 GB. Treat group figures as unverified.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties Canada: PIPEDA requires reporting breaches that pose a real risk of significant harm, as soon as feasible. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: Canada.
Within 30 days
- Review privileged and contract material Ask counsel which contracts and privileged files are named, and whether client or partner confidentiality terms oblige you to tell them. Why: The post names: contracts and legal files.
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Transportation organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: aurora listed 2 other Transportation organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
69/100 • ELEVATEDA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceNo scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.
Launch Attack Surface Recon →Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.