Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift
Dashboard / Victims / City of Princeton

City of Princeton was listed on 11 October 2026 by the incransom ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). incransom listed 28 organizations that month and 1045 in total.

  • Listed 39 days ago.
  • 1147 organizations were listed by all groups in October 2026, see the month.
  • 31 in Government & Defense that month.
  • 409 in US that month.

Updated 2026-11-19 05:29 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.

City of Princeton corporate emblem
Listed by incransom Disclosed: 2026-11-12 10:14 UTC

City of Princeton

cityofprincetonwi.com Government & Defense US

Threat Group Post & Evidence

Listed by
INC Ransom 1,045 listings in total

The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.

No capture of the original post

We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.

What the group says it holds

Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.

# City of Princeton, Texas — Municipal Government **Date added:** September 2026 **Website:** princetontx.us **Sector:** Government / Municipal Administration **Location:** Collin County, Texas, USA (Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex) **Employees:** ~150+ **Annual Budget:** $30–50M --- ## Who They Are The **City of Princeton** is a rapidly expanding municipality in Collin County, Texas — one of the fastest-growing areas in the United States. With an estimated population of 35,000–50,000 residents, over **13,750 active utility accounts**, and **12+ major residential subdivisions** under active development, Princeton handles significant volumes of citizen data daily. The city manages police, fire/EMS, a municipal court processing 1,000+ cases annually, public works, water and wastewater utilities, parks, a public library, and development services. --- ## What We Have **Complete backup of the cit…
Show the full post (9364 characters)

# City of Princeton, Texas — Municipal Government **Date added:** September 2026 **Website:** princetontx.us **Sector:** Government / Municipal Administration **Location:** Collin County, Texas, USA (Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex) **Employees:** ~150+ **Annual Budget:** $30–50M --- ## Who They Are The **City of Princeton** is a rapidly expanding municipality in Collin County, Texas — one of the fastest-growing areas in the United States. With an estimated population of 35,000–50,000 residents, over **13,750 active utility accounts**, and **12+ major residential subdivisions** under active development, Princeton handles significant volumes of citizen data daily. The city manages police, fire/EMS, a municipal court processing 1,000+ cases annually, public works, water and wastewater utilities, parks, a public library, and development services. --- ## What We Have **Complete backup of the city's internal file server** — over **20 departmental folders** spanning every branch of municipal operations. Structured databases, financial records, email archives totaling nearly 2 GB, full forensic extractions of elected officials' personal devices, court records, and active credentials to city systems. Below is a summary. This is not everything. --- ### 14,000+ Citizen Records — Names, Addresses, Account Numbers, Balances The city's Utility Billing department maintained detailed records on nearly every resident: - **13,249 residential addresses** — full names, utility account numbers, complete physical addresses, service classification, and account status - **13,756 sewer service records** — overlapping dataset with account-level detail - **2,540+ new residential accounts** opened between 2024–2025 across all active subdivisions (Sicily, Monticello, Winchester, Whitewing, Cypress Creek, Forest Park, Princeton Heights, Windmore, Lowry Trails, and others) - **430 disconnect records** — names, addresses, outstanding balances, **partial Social Security Numbers**, collection status, and associated landlord information - **408 delinquent accounts** — names, addresses, and itemized balance aging from current to 120+ days overdue Every Princeton resident with a utility account is in this dataset. Every address. Every balance. Some with SSN fragments. --- ### Mayor's Phone — 299,240 Artifacts, Full Extraction A **Magnet AXIOM forensic extraction** of Mayor **Eugene Escobar Jr.'s iPhone** was performed by the city's own police department (Sergeant C. Crawford, Badge #2203, April 23, 2026). We have the complete output: - **299,240 total artifacts** — the full digital life of the sitting Mayor - **12.97 GB of attachments** — photos, documents, media - **Complete SMS and iMessage history** — private conversations with Council members, the City Manager, attorneys, outside advisors, and personal contacts - **Full call log** with timestamps, durations, and contact identifiers - **File system contents** of the device What those messages reveal: - **Open hostility between Mayor Escobar and Council Member Cristina Todd** — the Mayor refusing to attend events, demanding all communication go through email, proposing mediation meetings at restaurants. Todd accusing city staff of withholding documents. Escalating confrontations via text. - **Police Chief Stephens resigning** — confirmed via text from Alt. City Manager Jeff Jones: *"Chief Stephens is resigning and going back to The Colony"* - **Active internal investigation** — the city engaged a law firm; attorneys were preparing "redacted versions" of investigation documents; the Mayor pushed back: *"Redacted? Why is it redacted?"* - **City Manager search** being conducted simultaneously - **Potential conflict of interest** — "Eugene Escobar Jr. & Associates" appears on the city's own official partner/vendor list while Escobar serves as Mayor Also extracted: - **Mayor's iPad** — 4.56 GB, full portable case with dependencies - **Director of Development Services (Shailaja "Shai" Roos) phone** — 137 text messages and 367 voice call records with carrier-level metadata, including private discussions about salary negotiations (*"$120,000 and flexibility to work from home one day a week"*), hiring decisions, zoning disputes, and coordination with Council members and P&Z commissioners outside official channels --- ### 1,000+ Municipal Court Cases — Defendants, Insurance, Driving Records The Municipal Court handles Class C misdemeanors, traffic violations, and city ordinance cases. We have: - **Complete offense code and fine schedule** — every violation type the city prosecutes, with associated penalties - **Individual case files** containing defendant full names, insurance card scans, Texas driving records, letters of legal representation, and case dispositions - **Video evidence** — incident footage, altercation recordings (MP4/MOV files) used in court proceedings - **Citation summaries** with outstanding balances and warrant information - **Judge RFQ** — the city is actively seeking a new Municipal Court Judge (RFQ #26-100022, deadline September 10, 2026) Anyone who has been cited, ticketed, or charged by the City of Princeton — their records are here. --- ### Active Credentials — 10 Accounts, Passwords in Plaintext A Chrome browser password export from a city employee contains **working credentials** for: - **cityofprincetontx.aws.executime.com** — HR/payroll/timekeeping system (password equals username) - **princeton.biblionix.com** — Library management system - **texas.vdxhost.com / texas.agshareit.com** — Inter-library loan platforms (shared generic credentials) - **application.notaries.com** — Notary application portal - **member.txla.org** — Texas Library Association membership - **login.yahoo.com** — Shared institutional email account Password patterns are predictable: `Word+Year+Symbol` format. The ExecuTime HR system uses **username as password**. These credentials were active at time of extraction. --- ### 1.9 GB of Email Archives — Officials, Legal, Investigations Exchange PST exports from **multiple city employee mailboxes**: | Archive | Size | Content | |---------|------|---------| | State Farm Development — all employees | 978 MB | Full development correspondence | | Eugene Escobar Jr. & Associates | 329 MB | Mayor's associated business communications | | Cristina Todd & Shai Roos | 306 MB | Council member + Director correspondence | | Cristina Todd mailbox | 73 MB | Council member's full email | | Maxine Ellis mailbox | 67 MB | City staff email | | Business View Magazine | 64 MB | Editorial/media planning | | Ryan Shiflet mailbox | 4.8 MB | City staff email | | Additional archives | ~77 MB | General requests, additional staff | These archives contain correspondence related to **active legal matters**, internal investigations, policy decisions, vendor negotiations, and personnel actions. --- ### Legal Files — Active Litigation, 100+ Open Records Requests, Subpoenas - **Godby vs. City of Princeton** — active lawsuit documentation - **100+ Public Information Requests** (reference numbers W047259 through W051876) — filed in 2025–2026, many related to the Mayor, budget decisions, and internal conflicts - **Subpoena Duces Tecum** documents - **Compliance folder** — email exports pulled from employee personal devices as part of legal preservation - **Multiple complaint files** involving elected officials - **DEIB investigation materials** — internal review documents --- ### Complete Internal Phone Directory Every department, every extension, every direct line — including: - **Non-public police dispatch:** 972-547-5350 - **All department heads** with direct numbers and cell phones - **Mayor, Council members, City Manager** contact information - **Vendor and contractor** emergency contacts - **Utility provider** direct lines --- ### City Infrastructure — Engineering, Security, Utilities - Water and wastewater **master plans** — system-wide design documents - Public works **engineering specifications** — lift station designs, drainage systems - **Generator inventory** for critical facilities - **Security camera layouts** — Parks Department surveillance positioning - **Budget documents** spanning FY2024 through FY2027 - Contracts, surety bonds, easements, subdivision plats - Fleet management records, facilities maintenance schedules --- ## The Full Picture This is not a partial leak. This is **everything** — the complete digital footprint of a Texas city government. The personal data of **over 14,000 citizens**. The private text messages from the **Mayor's phone**. Court records for **over a thousand defendants**. **Working passwords** to city systems. **Nearly two gigabytes** of official email including active legal matters. Forensic device extractions that expose a city government in internal crisis — a Mayor at war with his own Council, a Police Chief walking out the door, attorneys drafting redacted reports, and salary deals cut over text message. The citizens of Princeton trusted their city with their names, addresses, Social Security Numbers, and court records. The Mayor trusted his phone with conversations that were never meant to be public. That trust now depends entirely on what happens next. **Contact deadline: 10 days. After that, full publication begins — starting with the citizen database and the Mayor's phone.**

Amounts as written

  • 2 GB
  • 12.97 GB
  • 4.56 GB
  • 10 Accounts
  • 1.9 GB
  • 978 MB
  • 329 MB
  • 306 MB

Kinds of data mentioned

  • Accounting and ledgers

    “…W047259 through W051876) — filed in 2025–2026, many related to the Mayor, budget decisions, and internal conflicts - **Subpoena Duces Tecum** documents - **Compliance folder**…”

  • Payroll and salaries

    “…records with carrier-level metadata, including private discussions about salary negotiations (*"$120,000 and flexibility to work from home one day a week"*), hiring decisions,…”

  • Identity documents

    “…disconnect records** — names, addresses, outstanding balances, **partial Social Security Numbers**, collection status, and associated landlord information - **408 delinquent accounts**…”

  • Passwords and credentials

    “…extractions of elected officials' personal devices, court records, and active credentials to city systems. Below is a summary. This is not everything. --- ### 14,000+ Citizen Records…”

  • Email and communications

    “…branch of municipal operations. Structured databases, financial records, email archives totaling nearly 2 GB, full forensic extractions of elected officials' personal devices,…”

  • Customer or client data

    “…**Complete SMS and iMessage history** — private conversations with Council members, the City Manager, attorneys, outside advisors, and personal contacts - **Full call log**…”

  • Employee and HR records

    “…email, proposing mediation meetings at restaurants. Todd accusing city staff of withholding documents. Escalating confrontations via text. - **Police Chief Stephens resigning**…”

  • Contracts and legal files

    “…violation type the city prosecutes, with associated penalties - **Individual case files** containing defendant full names, insurance card scans, Texas driving records, letters of…”

  • Databases and backups

    “--- ## What We Have **Complete backup of the city's internal file server** — over **20 departmental folders** spanning every branch…”

Plain-English summary AI-written

The group says it holds significant volumes of citizen data handled by the City of Princeton.

Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.

What to do about this listing

Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.

If you work with City of Princeton (customer, supplier or partner)

Within 3 days

  • Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
  • Ask City of Princeton directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
  • Review what City of Princeton can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
  • Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data, email and communications, passwords and credentials, identity documents, employee and hr records.
  • Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: payroll and salaries, accounting and ledgers.
  • Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: databases and backups.

Within 30 days

  • Keep watching City of Princeton A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are City of Princeton

First 24 hours

  • Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials, identity documents, email and communications, customer or client data, payroll and salaries.
  • Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: payroll and salaries, accounting and ledgers.

Within 3 days

  • Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: employee and hr records, identity documents.
  • Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
  • Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
  • Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 2 GB, 12.97 GB, 4.56 GB. Treat group figures as unverified.
  • Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties United States: state breach-notification laws apply; listed companies may also have SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 duties for material incidents, and HIPAA applies to health data. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: United States.

Within 30 days

  • Review privileged and contract material Ask counsel which contracts and privileged files are named, and whether client or partner confidentiality terms oblige you to tell them. Why: The post names: contracts and legal files.
  • Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Government & Defense organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: incransom listed 6 other Government & Defense organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
  • Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.

Listing details

Resolved Domain cityofprincetonwi.com
Industry Vertical Government & Defense
Country US
Enrichment Status ENRICHED

Listing severity score (heuristic)

100/100 • CRITICAL

A heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.

1. Sector Criticality 30/30 pts
Government, public safety and defense
2. Group tier 25/25 pts
Tier 1: among the groups with the most listings in our data
3. Data Volume & PII Scope 25/25 pts
Largest claim: a terabyte or more, or regulated data named in the post
Formula: sector • group tier • data claimed (scaled to 100) Rule-based score

External Attack Surface Profile

ASM Intelligence

No scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.

Open the full attack surface scan →
Is Your Organization Exposed?

Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.

More Claims by incransom

All →
Boeing
Government & Defense 2026-11-20 03:46 UTC
CHAMBOURCY
Agriculture and Food Production 2026-11-19 17:35 UTC
Pulsar
Technology 2026-11-19 01:56 UTC
CENTERED CO., LTD.
Technology 2026-11-19 01:56 UTC
Chin Fong Machine Industrial
Manufacturing 2026-11-17 00:14 UTC
pilotcat.com
Technology 2026-11-16 22:40 UTC