Steffen family retail group was listed on 16 November 2026 by the rhysida ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). rhysida listed 15 organizations that month and 328 in total.
- Listed 3 days ago.
- 983 organizations were listed by all groups in November 2026, see the month.
- 113 in Retail & E-Commerce that month.
Updated 2026-11-19 05:29 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
Steffen family retail group
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Rhysida 328 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
Dark Web Leak Proof Screenshot
Original Source (Safe Tor Stream)The group's leak-site address is on paid plans
Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
Steffen family retail group We have fully copied the servers (hansa.local domain) of the Steffenfamily retail group - fashion/footwear/sports stores in Bremervorde,Zeven, Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Hemmoor, Harsefeld, Stade and Buxtehude(Mode Steffen KG, HRA 100744 AG Tostedt, USt-Id DE116928228, and ~17sister entities incl. Mercator & Blues real-estate companies).Volume: 673,267 files / 384 GB, incl. the LIVE BMD accounting database(9.6 million postings up to 30-Sep-2026), DOKinform/ELO documentarchives, email store, payroll infrastructure and terminal server.IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: German Personalausweise of all four owners -Jan Paul Friedrich Draack (Ausweis L287Y2G17), Hannes (Heidelberg),Helena (Hamburg), Henrik Draack - plus the death certificate ofG�nter Johann Draack (d. 14.06.2021).OWNER CASH INJECTIONS: �11.55 MILLION in personal money pushed intothe companies 2024�2026 ('Einlage', boo…
Show the full post (2008 characters)
Steffen family retail group We have fully copied the servers (hansa.local domain) of the Steffenfamily retail group - fashion/footwear/sports stores in Bremervorde,Zeven, Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Hemmoor, Harsefeld, Stade and Buxtehude(Mode Steffen KG, HRA 100744 AG Tostedt, USt-Id DE116928228, and ~17sister entities incl. Mercator & Blues real-estate companies).Volume: 673,267 files / 384 GB, incl. the LIVE BMD accounting database(9.6 million postings up to 30-Sep-2026), DOKinform/ELO documentarchives, email store, payroll infrastructure and terminal server.IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: German Personalausweise of all four owners -Jan Paul Friedrich Draack (Ausweis L287Y2G17), Hannes (Heidelberg),Helena (Hamburg), Henrik Draack - plus the death certificate ofG�nter Johann Draack (d. 14.06.2021).OWNER CASH INJECTIONS: �11.55 MILLION in personal money pushed intothe companies 2024�2026 ('Einlage', bookings of 10.03 / 24.09 /22.12.2025 etc., from IBAN DE54..8622, DE18..6693, DE41..8002).Retail ran at a LOSS in 2026 (Mode-Steffen KG -�714k) � where didthe millions come from?ASSET SHIFTING: �5,525,000 + �3,350,000 paid 09-May-2025('Bening Kaufpreis') to move property into separate Mercator GmbHs;only the rentals (��1.4M/yr profit) stay profitable � stores losemoney.REAL GROUP NUMBERS: profit before tax 2024 �2,453,444 (2023:�3,360,303); negative MODE KG capital account of -�4.3M on31.12.2023 (own ledger); personal income tax prepayments of theowner ~�272k/yr.PASSWORDS PLAINTEXT: the CFO's and the accounting clerk's passwordfiles - Outlook/Office365, banks, PayPal, Amazon/Zalando/Otto/Kaufland seller accounts, merchant terminals (SparkasseH�ndlerservice contract 4556519585).100+ SUPPLIER relationships (Tom Tailor, PVH, s.Oliver, CBR, EK,INTERSPORT, Bestseller...) - payment volumes 2024�2026 mapped.The family is now transferring the real estate (rental income�1.7M/yr) to the three children. They think nobody sees it.Everyone in Bremerv�rde, Zeven and Cuxhaven will soon see everything. More
Amounts as written
- 673,267 files
- 384 GB
Kinds of data mentioned
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Tax records
“…profit) stay profitable � stores losemoney.REAL GROUP NUMBERS: profit before tax 2024 �2,453,444 (2023:�3,360,303); negative MODE KG capital account of -�4.3M on31.12.2023…”
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Accounting and ledgers
“…real-estate companies).Volume: 673,267 files / 384 GB, incl. the LIVE BMD accounting database(9.6 million postings up to 30-Sep-2026), DOKinform/ELO documentarchives, email store,…”
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Banking and wire details
“…2024�2026 ('Einlage', bookings of 10.03 / 24.09 /22.12.2025 etc., from IBAN DE54..8622, DE18..6693, DE41..8002).Retail ran at a LOSS in 2026 (Mode-Steffen KG -�714k)…”
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Payroll and salaries
“…postings up to 30-Sep-2026), DOKinform/ELO documentarchives, email store, payroll infrastructure and terminal server.IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: German Personalausweise of all four…”
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Passwords and credentials
“…on31.12.2023 (own ledger); personal income tax prepayments of theowner ~�272k/yr.PASSWORDS PLAINTEXT: the CFO's and the accounting clerk's passwordfiles - Outlook/Office365, banks,…”
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Email and communications
“…database(9.6 million postings up to 30-Sep-2026), DOKinform/ELO documentarchives, email store, payroll infrastructure and terminal server.IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: German Personalausweise…”
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Contracts and legal files
“…Amazon/Zalando/Otto/Kaufland seller accounts, merchant terminals (SparkasseH�ndlerservice contract 4556519585).100+ SUPPLIER relationships (Tom Tailor, PVH, s.Oliver, CBR, EK,INTERSPORT, Bestseller...)…”
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Databases and backups
“…companies).Volume: 673,267 files / 384 GB, incl. the LIVE BMD accounting database(9.6 million postings up to 30-Sep-2026), DOKinform/ELO documentarchives, email store, payroll…”
Plain-English summary AI-written
The group says it copied the Steffen family retail group’s servers, including accounting data, document archives, email, payroll infrastructure, and a terminal server.
Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with Steffen family retail group (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask Steffen family retail group directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what Steffen family retail group can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: email and communications, passwords and credentials.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, payroll and salaries, accounting and ledgers, tax records.
- Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching Steffen family retail group A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are Steffen family retail group
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials, email and communications, payroll and salaries.
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, payroll and salaries, accounting and ledgers.
Within 3 days
- Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
- Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 673,267 files, 384 GB. Treat group figures as unverified.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties No country is recorded for this listing. Identify the data-protection and contractual duties that apply where the affected people live, and ask counsel. General guidance, not legal advice. Why: The listing records no country.
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Check the ways rhysida is reported to get in
Check these first; they are how the group is reported to work in general.
- Actors typically log in to VPN access points with stolen valid credentials, which the advisory ties to organizations without multi-factor authentication. (update of Apr 2025)
Within 30 days
- Review privileged and contract material Ask counsel which contracts and privileged files are named, and whether client or partner confidentiality terms oblige you to tell them. Why: The post names: contracts and legal files.
- Watch for tax-filing fraud Tell your tax advisers and, where available, tax authorities so fraudulent filings made with exposed identifiers can be caught early. Why: The post names: tax records.
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Retail & E-Commerce organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: rhysida listed 2 other Retail & E-Commerce organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
58/100 • GUARDEDA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceNo scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.
Launch Attack Surface Recon →Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.