Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift
Dashboard / Victims / Sunflower Medical Group

Sunflower Medical Group was listed on 07 January 2025 by the rhysida ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). rhysida listed 8 organizations that month and 327 in total.

  • Listed 681 days ago.
  • 613 organizations were listed by all groups in January 2025, see the month.
  • 46 in Healthcare that month.
  • 262 in US that month.

Updated 2026-11-19 06:21 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.

Sunflower Medical Group corporate emblem
Listed by rhysida Disclosed: 2025-01-07 09:44 UTC

Sunflower Medical Group

sunflowermed.com Healthcare US

Threat Group Post & Evidence

Listed by
Rhysida 327 listings in total

The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.

No capture of the original post

We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.

What the group says it holds

Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.

Sunflower Medical Group With only 7 days to spare, take the opportunity to bet on exclusive, unique, and impressive data. More than 400 thousand driver's licenses, insurance cards, social security numbers. Sql base is more than 3TB. Open your wallets and get ready to buy exclusive data. We sell only to one person, no resale, you will be the only owner!

Amounts as written

  • 3TB

Kinds of data mentioned

  • Databases and backups

    “Sql base is more than 3TB. Open your wallets and get ready to buy exclusive data. We sell only…”

Plain-English summary AI-written

The group says it holds more than 400 thousand driver’s licenses, insurance cards, and Social Security numbers, along with a SQL database larger than 3TB.

Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.

What to do about this listing

Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.

If you work with Sunflower Medical Group (customer, supplier or partner)

Within 3 days

  • Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
  • Ask Sunflower Medical Group directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
  • Review what Sunflower Medical Group can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
  • Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: databases and backups.

Within 30 days

  • Keep watching Sunflower Medical Group A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are Sunflower Medical Group

Within 3 days

  • Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
  • Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 3TB. Treat group figures as unverified.
  • Lock down exposed admin, VPN and SSO panels Restrict by IP allow-list or a zero-trust proxy and require MFA. Why: A passive scan found 1 critical panel(s) reachable from the internet.
  • Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties United States: state breach-notification laws apply; listed companies may also have SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 duties for material incidents, and HIPAA applies to health data. Health data adds sector rules. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: United States.
  • Check the ways rhysida is reported to get in Check these first; they are how the group is reported to work in general.
    • Actors typically log in to VPN access points with stolen valid credentials, which the advisory ties to organizations without multi-factor authentication. (update of Apr 2025)
    Source: #StopRansomware: Rhysida Ransomware (AA23-319A) Why: From the public advisory below. It describes the group, not how Sunflower Medical Group was entered.

Within 30 days

  • Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Healthcare organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: rhysida listed 8 other Healthcare organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
  • Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.

Listing details

Resolved Domain sunflowermed.com
Industry Vertical Healthcare
Country US
Enrichment Status ENRICHED

Listing severity score (heuristic)

91/100 • CRITICAL

A heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.

1. Sector Criticality 30/30 pts
Healthcare and life sciences
2. Group tier 18/25 pts
Tier 2: a group with a large number of listings
3. Data Volume & PII Scope 25/25 pts
Largest claim: a terabyte or more, or regulated data named in the post
Formula: sector • group tier • data claimed (scaled to 100) Rule-based score

External Attack Surface Profile

ASM Intelligence
98/100 • CRITICAL
Last Audited: 2026-11-14 18:18 UTC Passive Recon
Total Network Assets 6
3 hosts • 3 unique IPs
1 cloud-hosted • 0 SaaS
Subdomain Assets 3
Critical Panels 1 (VPN/Admin/SSO)
Non-Prod / UAT 0 Staging/Dev
SaaS Ecosystem 0 Cloud Apps
Primary CSP Everfast Fiber N
Email Security Grade F (SPF/DMARC)
Open the full attack surface scan →
Is Your Organization Exposed?

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Defense Telemetry

Passive DNS
Mail Gateway Not Disclosed / Unresolved
DNS Authority Authoritative DNS (com)
Edge CDN / Shield None
SPF Record Missing
DMARC Policy Missing
Public DNS records only • no port scanning

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