Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift
Dashboard / Victims / hsc.mb.ca

hsc.mb.ca was listed on 10 October 2026 by the incransom ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). incransom listed 28 organizations that month and 1046 in total.

  • Listed 41 days ago.
  • 1147 organizations were listed by all groups in October 2026, see the month.
  • 157 in Healthcare that month.
  • 27 in CA that month.
  • 1 other listing for the same organization.

Updated 2026-11-19 05:33 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.

hsc.mb.ca corporate emblem
Listed by incransom Disclosed: 2026-10-11 01:14 UTC

hsc.mb.ca

mb.ca Healthcare CA

Named in 2 separate listings

Another listing name this organization: a different group, or the same group months apart. Each is a claim the group published, not a confirmed breach. The same group listing it again within a few months is not counted: that is the same listing sent twice or moved from countdown to published.

This listing: incransom, 11 Oct 2026 play, 23 Jun 2024

Threat Group Post & Evidence

Listed by
INC Ransom 1,046 listings in total

The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.

No capture of the original post

We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.

The group's leak-site address is on paid plans

Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.

What the group says it holds

Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.

The Health Sciences Centre in Winnipeg, one of the largest medical institutions, was targeted by us that resulted in the largest data breach among healthcare institutions. Our group chose not to completely disrupt the facility’s operations, recognizing the potentially devastating consequences that such an action could have had on patients’ lives and health. Nevertheless, Health Sciences Centre management stated that no sensitive data had been affected, despite having been informed otherwise. The data included, but was not limited to, the following information: Patient medical records: Full name, date of birth, address and phone number Hospital medical record number Diagnoses, medical history, allergies and medications Laboratory results, imaging reports Appointment dates, treatment details and physician information. Employee and healthcare professional information: Names, contact details…
Show the full post (1498 characters)

The Health Sciences Centre in Winnipeg, one of the largest medical institutions, was targeted by us that resulted in the largest data breach among healthcare institutions. Our group chose not to completely disrupt the facility’s operations, recognizing the potentially devastating consequences that such an action could have had on patients’ lives and health. Nevertheless, Health Sciences Centre management stated that no sensitive data had been affected, despite having been informed otherwise. The data included, but was not limited to, the following information: Patient medical records: Full name, date of birth, address and phone number Hospital medical record number Diagnoses, medical history, allergies and medications Laboratory results, imaging reports Appointment dates, treatment details and physician information. Employee and healthcare professional information: Names, contact details, dates of birth and employee numbers Employment, payroll and banking information Professional credentials, work schedules and departmental assignments. Financial and insurance information: Billing records and payment histories Insurance or benefits claim information. Confidential hospital documents: Internal emails and staff communications System configurations, network diagrams and security procedures Database backups and exported spreadsheets. We would have very much preferred to avoid making this data breach public, but the management has left us with no other choice.

Kinds of data mentioned

  • Payroll and salaries

    “…Names, contact details, dates of birth and employee numbers Employment, payroll and banking information Professional credentials, work schedules and departmental assignments.…”

  • Passwords and credentials

    “…employee numbers Employment, payroll and banking information Professional credentials, work schedules and departmental assignments. Financial and insurance information: Billing…”

  • Email and communications

    “…benefits claim information. Confidential hospital documents: Internal emails and staff communications System configurations, network diagrams and security procedures Database…”

  • Medical or patient records

    “The Health Sciences Centre in Winnipeg, one of the largest medical institutions, was targeted by us that resulted in the largest data breach among healthcare…”

  • Employee and HR records

    “…reports Appointment dates, treatment details and physician information. Employee and healthcare professional information: Names, contact details, dates of birth and employee…”

  • Databases and backups

    “…communications System configurations, network diagrams and security procedures Database backups and exported spreadsheets. We would have very much preferred to avoid making this…”

Plain-English summary AI-written

The group says it holds Health Sciences Centre patient information, including names, contact details, medical record numbers, diagnoses, and medical history.

Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.

What to do about this listing

Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.

If you work with hsc.mb.ca (customer, supplier or partner)

Within 3 days

  • Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
  • Ask hsc.mb.ca directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
  • Review what hsc.mb.ca can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
  • Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: email and communications, passwords and credentials, employee and hr records.
  • Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: payroll and salaries.
  • Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
  • If you share health data with them You may be the data controller, with notification duties of your own. Ask counsel which health-privacy rules apply to you. Why: The post names medical or health data.

Within 30 days

  • Keep watching hsc.mb.ca A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are hsc.mb.ca

First 24 hours

  • Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials, email and communications, payroll and salaries.
  • Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: payroll and salaries.

Within 3 days

  • Handle health-data exposure Work out which patient or health records are in scope, apply the health-privacy notification rules that cover them, and prepare patient communications. Why: The post names: medical or patient records.
  • Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: employee and hr records.
  • Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
  • Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
  • Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties Canada: PIPEDA requires reporting breaches that pose a real risk of significant harm, as soon as feasible. Health data adds sector rules. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: Canada.

Within 30 days

  • Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Healthcare organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: incransom listed 17 other Healthcare organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
  • Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.

Listing details

Resolved Domain mb.ca
Industry Vertical Healthcare
Country CA
Enrichment Status ENRICHED

Listing severity score (heuristic)

100/100 • CRITICAL

A heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.

1. Sector Criticality 30/30 pts
Healthcare and life sciences
2. Group tier 25/25 pts
Tier 1: among the groups with the most listings in our data
3. Data Volume & PII Scope 25/25 pts
Largest claim: a terabyte or more, or regulated data named in the post
Formula: sector • group tier • data claimed (scaled to 100) Rule-based score

External Attack Surface Profile

ASM Intelligence

No scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.

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Defense Telemetry

Passive DNS
Mail Gateway Microsoft 365 / Exchange Online
DNS Authority Authoritative DNS (ca)
Edge CDN / Shield None
SPF Record Configured
DMARC Policy Enforced
Public DNS records only • no port scanning

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Other listings for this name

2 listings
incransom Viewing Now
2026-10-11 01:14 UTC Severity: 100/100
play GUARDED
2024-06-23 19:49 UTC Open listing →