DROP 1 — ALL FOUR CLINICS — 8,000 PATIENTS, 4,000 INVOICES, 7,733 CREDENTIALS was listed on 20 November 2026 by the Whitearmor ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). Whitearmor listed 9 organizations that month and 28 in total.
- Listed 0 days ago.
- 1018 organizations were listed by all groups in November 2026, see the month.
- 168 in Healthcare that month.
Updated 2026-11-20 21:59 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
DROP 1 — ALL FOUR CLINICS — 8,000 PATIENTS, 4,000 INVOICES, 7,733 CREDENTIALS
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Whitearmor 28 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
The group's leak-site address is on paid plans
Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
So the first batch is public. Not samples. Real files. Casanare was redeployed. Pajonal was redeployed. Urus is still out. Putumayo is still down, exactly as we left it. None of you wrote. PUBLISHED NOW: CASANARE 2,000 patients | 1,000 invoices | 500 third parties | 100 histories | 1,357 accounts PAJONAL 2,000 patients | 1,000 invoices | 500 third parties | 837 accounts PUTUMAYO 2,000 patients | 1,000 invoices | 500 third parties | 100 histories | 15 CUFE | 2,297 accounts URUS 2,000 patients | 1,000 invoices | 500 third parties | 3,242 accounts TOTAL: 8,000 patients with names and national IDs. 4,000 invoices with amounts and CUFE. 2,000 third parties. 200 scanned clinical histories, including HIV and mental health. 7,733 staff accounts with unsalted MD5. Every folder has README, counts and SHA256SUMS. Check them. Same five mistakes in all four: unauthenticated download.php, SQL injectio…
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So the first batch is public. Not samples. Real files. Casanare was redeployed. Pajonal was redeployed. Urus is still out. Putumayo is still down, exactly as we left it. None of you wrote. PUBLISHED NOW: CASANARE 2,000 patients | 1,000 invoices | 500 third parties | 100 histories | 1,357 accounts PAJONAL 2,000 patients | 1,000 invoices | 500 third parties | 837 accounts PUTUMAYO 2,000 patients | 1,000 invoices | 500 third parties | 100 histories | 15 CUFE | 2,297 accounts URUS 2,000 patients | 1,000 invoices | 500 third parties | 3,242 accounts TOTAL: 8,000 patients with names and national IDs. 4,000 invoices with amounts and CUFE. 2,000 third parties. 200 scanned clinical histories, including HIV and mental health. 7,733 staff accounts with unsalted MD5. Every folder has README, counts and SHA256SUMS. Check them. Same five mistakes in all four: unauthenticated download.php, SQL injection in login and reports, COPY TO PROGRAM straight to the postgres user, unsalted MD5, backups on the same server. No zero-day. Your own application, read back to you. The private channel and session are the same sent to you. Email: [email protected] Session: 0547b7f96d469ecb332e89d0108e71c92df5bacff6c4ed5b9801ab5fffe872ee67 DROP 2 IN 24 HOURS IF THE SILENCE CONTINUES. WE ARE NOT PLAYING.
Amounts as written
- 1,357 accounts
- 837 accounts
- 2,297 accounts
- 3,242 accounts
Kinds of data mentioned
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Accounting and ledgers
“…left it. None of you wrote. PUBLISHED NOW: CASANARE 2,000 patients 1,000 invoices 500 third parties 100 histories 1,357 accounts PAJONAL 2,000 patients 1,000 invoices 500 third…”
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Email and communications
“…back to you. The private channel and session are the same sent to you. Email: [email protected] Session: 0547b7f96d469ecb332e89d0108e71c92df5bacff6c4ed5b9801ab5fffe872ee67…”
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Medical or patient records
“…exactly as we left it. None of you wrote. PUBLISHED NOW: CASANARE 2,000 patients 1,000 invoices 500 third parties 100 histories 1,357 accounts PAJONAL 2,000 patients 1,000…”
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Employee and HR records
“…200 scanned clinical histories, including HIV and mental health. 7,733 staff accounts with unsalted MD5. Every folder has README, counts and SHA256SUMS. Check them. Same…”
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Databases and backups
“…Check them. Same five mistakes in all four: unauthenticated download.php, SQL injection in login and reports, COPY TO PROGRAM straight to the postgres user, unsalted MD5,…”
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with DROP 1 — ALL FOUR CLINICS — 8,000 PATIENTS, 4,000 INVOICES, 7,733 CREDENTIALS (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask DROP 1 — ALL FOUR CLINICS — 8,000 PATIENTS, 4,000 INVOICES, 7,733 CREDENTIALS directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what DROP 1 — ALL FOUR CLINICS — 8,000 PATIENTS, 4,000 INVOICES, 7,733 CREDENTIALS can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: email and communications, employee and hr records.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: accounting and ledgers.
- Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
- If you share health data with them You may be the data controller, with notification duties of your own. Ask counsel which health-privacy rules apply to you. Why: The post names medical or health data.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching DROP 1 — ALL FOUR CLINICS — 8,000 PATIENTS, 4,000 INVOICES, 7,733 CREDENTIALS A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are DROP 1 — ALL FOUR CLINICS — 8,000 PATIENTS, 4,000 INVOICES, 7,733 CREDENTIALS
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: accounting and ledgers.
Within 3 days
- Handle health-data exposure Work out which patient or health records are in scope, apply the health-privacy notification rules that cover them, and prepare patient communications. Why: The post names: medical or patient records.
- Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: employee and hr records.
- Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
- Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 1,357 accounts, 837 accounts, 2,297 accounts. Treat group figures as unverified.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties Health data adds sector rules. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: The listing or sector points to health data.
Within 30 days
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Healthcare organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: Whitearmor listed 3 other Healthcare organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
81/100 • CRITICALA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceNo scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.
Launch Attack Surface Recon →Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.