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Dashboard / Victims / aidon.com

aidon.com was listed on 03 September 2026 by the incransom ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). incransom listed 29 organizations that month and 1044 in total.

  • Listed 77 days ago.
  • 874 organizations were listed by all groups in September 2026, see the month.
  • 141 in Technology that month.
  • 5 in FI that month.

Updated 2026-11-19 05:29 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.

aidon.com corporate emblem
Listed by incransom Disclosed: 2026-11-12 10:19 UTC

aidon.com

aidon.com Technology FI

Threat Group Post & Evidence

Listed by
INC Ransom 1,044 listings in total

The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.

No capture of the original post

We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.

What the group says it holds

Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.

# Aidon Oy / Gridspertise (Enel Group) — Smart Meter Operations Platform Breach **Date:** September 2026 **Sector:** Critical Infrastructure — Energy / Smart Grid **Country:** Finland **Parent Company:** Gridspertise S.r.l. (joint venture: Enel Group + CVC Capital Partners) --- ## Summary The Smart Meter Operations (SMO) platform operated by **Aidon Oy** — Finland's leading smart metering company and a subsidiary of **Gridspertise** (Enel Group) — has been fully compromised. The platform serves as the central head-end system for dozens of Finnish distribution system operators (DSOs), managing millions of smart electricity meters across the country. Between **April 19 and May 1, 2026**, a total of **9,899 files (8.41 TB)** were extracted from **eight SQL Server instances** within the platform's internal cluster (10.110.4.0/24, legacy domain: empalvelut.dom). This is the largest known brea…
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# Aidon Oy / Gridspertise (Enel Group) — Smart Meter Operations Platform Breach **Date:** September 2026 **Sector:** Critical Infrastructure — Energy / Smart Grid **Country:** Finland **Parent Company:** Gridspertise S.r.l. (joint venture: Enel Group + CVC Capital Partners) --- ## Summary The Smart Meter Operations (SMO) platform operated by **Aidon Oy** — Finland's leading smart metering company and a subsidiary of **Gridspertise** (Enel Group) — has been fully compromised. The platform serves as the central head-end system for dozens of Finnish distribution system operators (DSOs), managing millions of smart electricity meters across the country. Between **April 19 and May 1, 2026**, a total of **9,899 files (8.41 TB)** were extracted from **eight SQL Server instances** within the platform's internal cluster (10.110.4.0/24, legacy domain: empalvelut.dom). This is the largest known breach of smart grid infrastructure in the Nordic region. --- ## By the Numbers | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | **AES-128 encryption keys** | 520,796 (Unicast / Multicast / Authentication) | | **Citizen PII records** | ~1,500,000 | | **Total data exfiltrated** | 8.41 TB | | **SQL servers compromised** | 8 | | **Databases** | 25+ (~2.4 TB on disk) | | **Full SQL backups (.bak)** | 368 | | **Transaction logs (.trn)** | 9,079 (15-minute intervals — continuous chain) | | **Live database files (.mdf/.ldf/.ndf)** | 218 | | **User accounts with credentials** | 74 (SHA-512 + TOTP secrets + 23 API keys) | | **SIM / IMSI records** | 108,000+ | | **GPS coordinates of metering points** | 91,430+ | | **Affected organizations** | 10+ energy utilities | | **Data period** | 19 April – 1 May 2026 | --- ## What Was Compromised ### 1. Smart Meter Encryption Keys — 520,796 AES-128 keys The **SecurityManager** database contains 520,796 AES-128-CBC encryption keys used to secure communication with smart meters in the field. Three key types are stored per device: - **Unicast** — device-specific encrypted communication - **Authentication** — meter identity verification - **Multicast** — group commands (firmware updates, disconnect/reconnect) Possession of these keys enables: decryption of all mesh network traffic, forging of commands to meters, and remote disconnection of electricity supply across entire regions. This represents an **existential threat to the security claims of Aidon's entire product line** — the company manufactures the meters (ADN6534, ADN7534, ADN7442, ADN6490) and operates the head-end. ![AES-128 Keys Sample](04_AES128_KEYS_sample.png) ### 2. Personal Data — ~1.5 Million Finnish Citizens Across 11 Meteringware customer data shards, the Vantage platform, and municipal CDAPIDB instances, the following personal data was extracted for approximately 1.5 million individuals: - Full names and home addresses - GPS coordinates of metering points (91,430+ with precision coordinates) - Energy consumption profiles (15-minute intervals) - Customer GUIDs and metering point identifiers - Fuse sizes, meter serial numbers, device configurations This data covers residential and commercial electricity customers across Eastern and Central Finland. ![GPS Map — Metering Points](08_GPS_MAP_metering_points.png) ![PII Table with GPS](09_PII_GPS_metering_points.png) ### 3. User Accounts and Authentication Material — 74 Accounts The **UserManager** database contains 74 operator accounts across multiple organizations: | Domain | Accounts | |--------|----------| | @aidon.com | 31 | | @enerim.com | 17 | | @ese.fi | 9 | | @pbe.fi | 4 | | @savonvoima.fi | 3 | | @keoy.fi | 2 | | Service/API accounts | 8 | Each account includes: SHA-512 password hash, salt, **TOTP secret** (time-based one-time password seed), creation date, and last login timestamp. Additionally, 23 API keys were extracted from the ApiKey table. The TOTP secrets allow real-time generation of valid two-factor authentication codes for any of these accounts. Notable: the account of **Aidon's CTO** is among the compromised records, with a last login of April 24, 2026. ![UserManager Accounts](06_USERMANAGER_accounts.png) ![Email Domain Distribution](07_EMAIL_DOMAINS_chart.png) ### 4. Telecom Data — 108,000+ SIM Records The platform stores cellular connectivity data for every smart meter with a SIM module: - SIM IMSI numbers (89358020...) - ICCID identifiers - Phone numbers (+358...) - Device IP:port endpoints (10.83.x.x:9999) - Mesh network topology (RSSI levels, communication roles) - Communication technology flags (Cellular / Radio) ### 5. DSO Client Databases — Per-Utility Isolation Breached Server 10.110.4.216 hosts **six named SQL instances**, each dedicated to a specific distribution system operator: - **PORVOO** — Porvoon Energia - **KERAVA** — Keravan Energia - **KSOY** — Koillis-Savon Yhtiöt - **CST03, CST04** — Municipal DSOs - **TEST** — Test environment Each instance contains: CDAPIDB, VisionAir, and VisionAir_History databases. The per-client isolation model means every DSO's operational data was independently compromised. ![DSO Client Instances](10_DSO_CLIENTS_vantage.png) --- ## Infrastructure Overview Eight SQL Server instances were compromised on the 10.110.4.0/24 network: | Server | Role | Key Databases | |--------|------|---------------| | 10.110.4.191 | **Main SQL Server** | AidonReports, Meteringware (×11 shards), SecurityManager, UserManager, DataCollector, EventManager, Gateware, Linkware, Middleware | | 10.110.4.216 | Multi-instance (6 DSOs) | CDAPIDB, VisionAir, VisionAir_History per client | | 10.110.4.239 | Vantage Platform | Vantage Data + BR/CR/LP/ME + ReportServer | | 10.110.4.234 | CDAPI + READyManager | READyManagerDB (contains Secrets table), CDAPI_DriverQuartz | | 10.110.4.226 | MSSQL15 | Gateware | | 10.110.4.70 | MSSQL13 | Gateware, meshnet, MitoxAMRReportingDb, RKGateware | | 10.110.4.32 | Gateware | Gateware replica | | 10.110.4.12 | meshnet | Mesh network database | Total: **42 databases**, **5,535 user tables**, **67,888 views**, approximately **2.4 TB** of structured data. ![Server Infrastructure](12_SERVER_INFRASTRUCTURE.png) ![Database Inventory](05_DATABASE_INVENTORY.png) ![File Tree](02_FILE_TREE_servers.png) ![Backup Files](03_BACKUP_FILES_listing.png) --- ## Corporate Structure **Aidon Oy** (Y-tunnus: 1881960-4) is a Finnish smart metering company headquartered in Jyväskylä. Aidon manufactures smart electricity meters and operates head-end platforms (Meteringware, Gateware, Linkware) as managed services for distribution system operators across Finland and the Nordics. In **September 2023**, Aidon acquired the Smart Meter Operations (SMO) business — the compromised platform — from Enerim Oy. The SMO platform provides automated reading services for smart meters across Finland. In **November 2023**, Aidon was itself acquired by **Gridspertise S.r.l.**, a joint venture between **Enel Group** (Italy, €70B+ revenue) and **CVC Capital Partners**. Gridspertise manages over 100 million smart meters worldwide. The Aidon board includes: - **Marco Zallocco** — Chairman (Gridspertise representative) - **Francesca Pizzarello** — Board member (Gridspertise/Enel) - **Tommi Blomberg** — CEO --- ## Affected Organizations The following energy companies are confirmed clients on the compromised platform, with their customer data present in the extracted databases: | Organization | Type | |-------------|------| | Porvoon Energia | Municipal electricity utility (Porvoo) | | Keravan Energia | Municipal electricity utility (Kerava) | | KSOY (Koillis-Savon Yhtiöt) | Regional electricity utility | | Etelä-Savon Energia (ESE) | Regional electricity utility (Mikkeli) | | Savon Voima | Regional electricity utility | | PBE (Porvoon Energia subsidiary) | Electricity distribution | | KEOY | Electricity distribution | | Voimatel | Energy services | | Joroisten Energialaitos | Municipal utility (Joroinen) | | Helen Oy | Helsinki electricity utility | The Vantage platform alone lists **3,037 customer entries** across dozens of Finnish energy companies, municipalities, and housing associations. --- ## Regulatory Exposure | Regulation | Impact | |-----------|--------| | **GDPR** | ~1.5 million data subjects. Art.33: 72-hour DPA notification. Art.34: mandatory individual notification. Fines up to 4% of global turnover. | | **NIS2 Directive** | Smart metering = critical infrastructure. Mandatory incident reporting to Traficom / NCSC-FI. Fines up to €10M or 2% of turnover. C-level personal liability. | | **Finnish Law** | Sähkömarkkinalaki (Electricity Market Act). Tietosuojalaki (Data Protection Act). Fingrid Datahub connection obligations. | Each affected DSO has **independent GDPR notification obligations** once they become aware their customer data was compromised on a third-party platform. This creates a cascade of mandatory regulatory disclosures. **Estimated total exposure: >€20,000,000** across GDPR fines, client contract losses, meter key rotation costs, and reputational damage to Gridspertise's global operations. ![Regulatory Impact](13_REGULATORY_IMPACT.png) --- ## Timeline ![Breach Timeline](01_BREACH_TIMELINE.png) | Date | Event | |------|-------| | 19 April 2026 | Initial access to SQL cluster | | 19 Apr – 1 May | Continuous exfiltration: 9,899 files, 8.41 TB | | 1 May 2026 | Exfiltration complete | | July 2026 | Initial contact sent to wrong entity (legacy domain confusion) | | 15 August 2026 | Attribution corrected — Aidon Oy identified as platform operator | | ~20 August 2026 | CEO and CFO of Aidon contacted directly with proof | | September 2026 | **No response received** | --- ## Proof Samples The following are representative samples only. Full datasets are retained. - **AES-128 encryption keys** — masked samples from SecurityManager.KeyInfos (520,796 records) - **User accounts** — Aidon, Enerim, and DSO operator accounts with masked credentials - **GPS metering points** — addresses and coordinates of 91,430+ installations - **Consumer PII** — names, addresses, meter serials, phone numbers (partially masked) - **Backup file listing** — 368 full backups + 9,079 transaction logs with timestamps - **Server certificate** — MS_AgentSigningCertificate with verifiable GUID - **DSO client instances** — per-utility SQL databases (PORVOO, KERAVA, KSOY, CST03, CST04) Data will not be published while a resolution remains possible.

Amounts as written

  • 9,899 files
  • 8.41 TB
  • 2.4 TB
  • 74 Accounts
  • 3,037 customer
  • 520,796 records

Kinds of data mentioned

  • Passwords and credentials

    “…| **Live database files (.mdf/.ldf/.ndf)** 218 | **User accounts with credentials** 74 (SHA-512 + TOTP secrets + 23 API keys) | **SIM / IMSI records** 108,000+ | **GPS coordinates…”

  • Email and communications

    “…April 24, 2026. ![UserManager Accounts](06_USERMANAGER_accounts.png) ![Email Domain Distribution](07_EMAIL_DOMAINS_chart.png) ### 4. Telecom Data — 108,000+ SIM Records…”

  • Customer or client data

    “…2. Personal Data — ~1.5 Million Finnish Citizens Across 11 Meteringware customer data shards, the Vantage platform, and municipal CDAPIDB instances, the following personal…”

  • Contracts and legal files

    “…disclosures. **Estimated total exposure: >€20,000,000** across GDPR fines, client contract losses, meter key rotation costs, and reputational damage to Gridspertise's global operations.…”

  • Databases and backups

    “…2026**, a total of **9,899 files (8.41 TB)** were extracted from **eight SQL Server instances** within the platform's internal cluster (10.110.4.0/24, legacy domain: empalvelut.dom).…”

Plain-English summary AI-written

The group says Aidon Oy’s Smart Meter Operations platform has been fully compromised and serves Finnish electricity distribution operators and smart meters.

Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.

What to do about this listing

Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.

If you work with aidon.com (customer, supplier or partner)

Within 3 days

  • Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
  • Ask aidon.com directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
  • Review what aidon.com can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
  • Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data, email and communications, passwords and credentials.
  • Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: databases and backups.

Within 30 days

  • Keep watching aidon.com A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are aidon.com

First 24 hours

  • Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials, email and communications, customer or client data.

Within 3 days

  • Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
  • Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
  • Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 9,899 files, 8.41 TB, 2.4 TB. Treat group figures as unverified.
  • Lock down exposed admin, VPN and SSO panels Restrict by IP allow-list or a zero-trust proxy and require MFA. Why: A passive scan found 3 critical panel(s) reachable from the internet.
  • Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties EU/EEA: GDPR Art. 33 and 34 require notifying the supervisory authority within 72 hours of becoming aware of a personal data breach, and affected people where risk is high. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: Finland.

Within 30 days

  • Review privileged and contract material Ask counsel which contracts and privileged files are named, and whether client or partner confidentiality terms oblige you to tell them. Why: The post names: contracts and legal files.
  • Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Technology organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: incransom listed 16 other Technology organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
  • Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.

Listing details

Resolved Domain aidon.com
Industry Vertical Technology
Country FI
Enrichment Status ENRICHED

Listing severity score (heuristic)

88/100 • CRITICAL

A heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.

1. Sector Criticality 20/30 pts
Technology and communications
2. Group tier 25/25 pts
Tier 1: among the groups with the most listings in our data
3. Data Volume & PII Scope 25/25 pts
Largest claim: a terabyte or more, or regulated data named in the post
Formula: sector • group tier • data claimed (scaled to 100) Rule-based score

External Attack Surface Profile

ASM Intelligence
97/100 • CRITICAL
Last Audited: 2026-11-14 15:49 UTC Passive Recon
Total Network Assets 30
8 hosts • 22 unique IPs
4 cloud-hosted • 1 SaaS
Subdomain Assets 8
Critical Panels 3 (VPN/Admin/SSO)
Non-Prod / UAT 0 Staging/Dev
SaaS Ecosystem 1 Cloud Apps
Primary CSP Microsoft Azure
Email Security Grade B (SPF/DMARC)
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Defense Telemetry

Passive DNS
Mail Gateway Microsoft 365 / Exchange Online
DNS Authority Authoritative DNS (com)
Edge CDN / Shield None
SPF Record Configured
DMARC Policy Enforced
Public DNS records only • no port scanning

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