Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift
Dashboard / Victims / Hagerman & Company

Hagerman & Company was listed on 19 June 2026 by the aurora ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). aurora listed 11 organizations that month and 61 in total.

  • Listed 154 days ago.
  • 708 organizations were listed by all groups in June 2026, see the month.
  • 134 in Professional Services that month.

Updated 2026-11-19 05:42 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.

Hagerman & Company corporate emblem
Listed by aurora Disclosed: 2026-06-19 13:52 UTC

Hagerman & Company

Professional Services

Threat Group Post & Evidence

Listed by
Aurora 61 listings in total

The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.

No capture of the original post

We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.

The group's leak-site address is on paid plans

Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.

What the group says it holds

Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.

*** — a 40-year-old Autodesk Platinum Partner headquartered in Mt. Zion, Illinois, serving 250+ enterprise customers across manufacturing, energy, defense, healthcare, and education. The exposed dataset includes: Complete proprietary source code for 15+ commercial products including the HNC Licensing System (License Generator, License Server, License Manager) — enabling unlimited piracy of all Hagerman products. 8+ plaintext database credentials in .udl files, including an Oracle SYS (DBA superuser) account with password "Hagerman@1!" reused across multiple systems. Engineering vault databases for 14+ critical infrastructure entities — NYPA (7 power plants including Niagara Falls), Kinder Morgan (Elba Island LNG terminal), HydroOne (Ontario electricity), Phillips 66, Chevron, and 8+ petroleum refineries. Defense/government data — NASA IT Security Requirements, Lockheed Martin configurati…
Show the full post (1234 characters)

*** — a 40-year-old Autodesk Platinum Partner headquartered in Mt. Zion, Illinois, serving 250+ enterprise customers across manufacturing, energy, defense, healthcare, and education. The exposed dataset includes: Complete proprietary source code for 15+ commercial products including the HNC Licensing System (License Generator, License Server, License Manager) — enabling unlimited piracy of all Hagerman products. 8+ plaintext database credentials in .udl files, including an Oracle SYS (DBA superuser) account with password "Hagerman@1!" reused across multiple systems. Engineering vault databases for 14+ critical infrastructure entities — NYPA (7 power plants including Niagara Falls), Kinder Morgan (Elba Island LNG terminal), HydroOne (Ontario electricity), Phillips 66, Chevron, and 8+ petroleum refineries. Defense/government data — NASA IT Security Requirements, Lockheed Martin configurations, Boeing-SVS vault data, JPL configurations. Azure DevOps transaction logs (1.6 GB) containing complete source code version history and potentially CI/CD deployment secrets. Third-party database credentials for Michigan State University (3 databases), Cal State Long Beach, and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center infrastructure.

Amounts as written

  • 1.6 GB

Kinds of data mentioned

  • Passwords and credentials

    “…enabling unlimited piracy of all Hagerman products. 8+ plaintext database credentials in .udl files, including an Oracle SYS (DBA superuser) account with password "Hagerman@1!"…”

  • Medical or patient records

    “…University (3 databases), Cal State Long Beach, and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center infrastructure.”

  • Source code and designs

    “The exposed dataset includes: Complete proprietary source code for 15+ commercial products including the HNC Licensing System (License Generator, License…”

  • Databases and backups

    “…Manager) — enabling unlimited piracy of all Hagerman products. 8+ plaintext database credentials in .udl files, including an Oracle SYS (DBA superuser) account with password "Hagerman@1!"…”

Plain-English summary AI-written

The group says it holds proprietary source code for commercial products, plaintext database credentials, and engineering vault databases for critical infrastructure entities.

Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.

What to do about this listing

Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.

If you work with Hagerman & Company (customer, supplier or partner)

Within 3 days

  • Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
  • Ask Hagerman & Company directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
  • Review what Hagerman & Company can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
  • Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials.
  • Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: source code and designs, databases and backups.
  • If you share health data with them You may be the data controller, with notification duties of your own. Ask counsel which health-privacy rules apply to you. Why: The post names medical or health data.

Within 30 days

  • Keep watching Hagerman & Company A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are Hagerman & Company

First 24 hours

  • Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials.

Within 3 days

  • Handle health-data exposure Work out which patient or health records are in scope, apply the health-privacy notification rules that cover them, and prepare patient communications. Why: The post names: medical or patient records.
  • Rotate secrets and signing keys Assume secrets in repositories are exposed: rotate API keys, tokens and code-signing keys, and review build and release systems for unexpected changes. Why: The post names: source code and designs.
  • Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
  • Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 1.6 GB. Treat group figures as unverified.
  • Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties Health data adds sector rules. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: The listing or sector points to health data.

Within 30 days

  • Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Professional Services organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: aurora listed 5 other Professional Services organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
  • Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.

Listing details

Resolved Domain Not stated
Industry Vertical Professional Services
Country Not stated
Enrichment Status ENRICHED

Listing severity score (heuristic)

56/100 • GUARDED

A heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.

1. Sector Criticality 10/30 pts
Commercial and general business
2. Group tier 10/25 pts
Tier 3: all other groups
3. Data Volume & PII Scope 25/25 pts
Largest claim: a terabyte or more, or regulated data named in the post
Formula: sector • group tier • data claimed (scaled to 100) Rule-based score

External Attack Surface Profile

ASM Intelligence

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