TPI Corporation was listed on 26 December 2022 by the avoslocker ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). avoslocker listed 41 organizations that month and 70 in total.
- Listed 1424 days ago.
- 489 organizations were listed by all groups in December 2022, see the month.
- 69 in Professional Services that month.
Updated 2026-11-19 07:07 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
TPI Corporation
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Avoslocker 70 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
Data Stolen: ~1TB of confidential data were NDA-agreemtents, email-bases, private conversations .msg, financial statements, IRS, confidential business information, engineering projects, legal statements, accounting statements etc. We uploaded small size of Stolen data in TPI-Part1.zip archive for public review: 2022-03-31 TPI Financial STMTS.pdf 2021-08-30 IRS CP216F Notice.pdf 2021-03-31 Mutual NDA - Hearn TPIFostoria Corporation v1.0 (Executed).pdf 2021-03-31 Headliner NVH Project.msg 2020-07-10 Mission National Ins. Co, 2020 Distribution.pdf 2020-03-16 Oliver's of Oregon Bankruptcy.pdf 2019-02-22 ProcessHeat - Project Thermo Countersigned CA - TPI.pdf 2019-02-15 TPICorpFostoriaProcessEquipment&CustomPaperTubesouthwest-Mutual Non-disclosure Agreement.msg 2013-04-15 Federal Mogul Mutual Confidentiality Agreement.pdf 2012-12-21 Emitted Energy Corp Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement.pdf Pete…
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Data Stolen: ~1TB of confidential data were NDA-agreemtents, email-bases, private conversations .msg, financial statements, IRS, confidential business information, engineering projects, legal statements, accounting statements etc. We uploaded small size of Stolen data in TPI-Part1.zip archive for public review: 2022-03-31 TPI Financial STMTS.pdf 2021-08-30 IRS CP216F Notice.pdf 2021-03-31 Mutual NDA - Hearn TPIFostoria Corporation v1.0 (Executed).pdf 2021-03-31 Headliner NVH Project.msg 2020-07-10 Mission National Ins. Co, 2020 Distribution.pdf 2020-03-16 Oliver's of Oregon Bankruptcy.pdf 2019-02-22 ProcessHeat - Project Thermo Countersigned CA - TPI.pdf 2019-02-15 TPICorpFostoriaProcessEquipment&CustomPaperTubesouthwest-Mutual Non-disclosure Agreement.msg 2013-04-15 Federal Mogul Mutual Confidentiality Agreement.pdf 2012-12-21 Emitted Energy Corp Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement.pdf Peter Wang Contact Info.pdf
Amounts as written
- 1TB
Kinds of data mentioned
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Tax records
“…NDA-agreemtents, email-bases, private conversations .msg, financial statements, IRS, confidential business information, engineering projects, legal statements, accounting statements…”
-
Accounting and ledgers
“…confidential business information, engineering projects, legal statements, accounting statements etc. We uploaded small size of Stolen data in TPI-Part1.zip archive for public…”
-
Email and communications
“Data Stolen: ~1TB of confidential data were NDA-agreemtents, email-bases, private conversations .msg, financial statements, IRS, confidential business information,…”
-
Contracts and legal files
“Data Stolen: ~1TB of confidential data were NDA-agreemtents, email-bases, private conversations .msg, financial statements, IRS, confidential…”
Plain-English summary AI-written
The group says it holds about 1TB of confidential data, including agreements, emails, private conversations, financial and business records, engineering projects, legal statements, and accounting statements.
Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with TPI (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask TPI directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what TPI can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: accounting and ledgers, tax records.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching TPI A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are TPI
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: accounting and ledgers.
Within 3 days
- Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 1TB. Treat group figures as unverified.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties No country is recorded for this listing. Identify the data-protection and contractual duties that apply where the affected people live, and ask counsel. General guidance, not legal advice. Why: The listing records no country.
Within 30 days
- Review privileged and contract material Ask counsel which contracts and privileged files are named, and whether client or partner confidentiality terms oblige you to tell them. Why: The post names: contracts and legal files.
- Watch for tax-filing fraud Tell your tax advisers and, where available, tax authorities so fraudulent filings made with exposed identifiers can be caught early. Why: The post names: tax records.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
56/100 • GUARDEDA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceNo scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.
Launch Attack Surface Recon →Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.