Vietnamese betting operator was listed on 18 September 2026 by the N0n ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). N0n listed 18 organizations that month and 368 in total.
- Listed 61 days ago.
- 874 organizations were listed by all groups in September 2026, see the month.
- 139 in Technology that month.
- 5 in VN that month.
Updated 2026-11-18 11:27 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
Vietnamese betting operator
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- N0n 368 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
Dark Web Leak Proof Screenshot
Original Source (Safe Tor Stream)The group's leak-site address is on paid plans
Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
Online gambling / agent platform · Vietnam / Switzerland | The complete bettor database: 2,021,011 registered bettors with names, +84 phone numbers, email addresses, deposit and withdrawal amounts; The full agent network: 39,998 agent accounts, hierarchy, balances, credit lines and commission ladders; 85 million login records with IP addresses and device identifiers; Daily trading and P&L data per provider; The fraud stack: 33,000+ blacklisted emails and phones, arbitrage and odds-mover reports, multi-account detection rules | Publication proceeds in batches after the deadline. | [ACTIVE: deadline 2026-09-20 01:37 UTC]
Kinds of data mentioned
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Email and communications
“…database: 2,021,011 registered bettors with names, +84 phone numbers, email addresses, deposit and withdrawal amounts; The full agent network: 39,998 agent accounts,…”
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Databases and backups
“The complete bettor database: 2,021,011 registered bettors with names, +84 phone numbers, email addresses, deposit and…”
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with Vietnamese betting operator (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask Vietnamese betting operator directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what Vietnamese betting operator can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching Vietnamese betting operator A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are Vietnamese betting operator
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: email and communications.
Within 3 days
- Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
- Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties No country is recorded for this listing. Identify the data-protection and contractual duties that apply where the affected people live, and ask counsel. General guidance, not legal advice. Why: The listing records no country.
Within 30 days
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Technology organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: N0n listed 65 other Technology organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
60/100 • ELEVATEDA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceNo scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.
Launch Attack Surface Recon →Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.