ERPIS LLC was listed on 26 August 2026 by the aurora ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). aurora listed 8 organizations that month and 61 in total.
- Listed 85 days ago.
- 1198 organizations were listed by all groups in August 2026, see the month.
- 132 in Professional Services that month.
Updated 2026-11-19 05:37 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
ERPIS LLC
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Aurora 61 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
The group's leak-site address is on paid plans
Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
[software] ERPIS LLC (doing business as ShipERP) — a Texas-based SAP integrator whose single product is enterprise shipping management software used by Boeing, Pfizer, NVIDIA, John Deere, Medtronic, and 83 other enterprise customers. The exposed material includes: Complete product source code — all versions (2.0–5.4) of ShipERP's ABAP source, the company's sole revenue-generating asset ($20.6M backlog) <redacted> Live QuickBooks financial database (705 MB) — complete payroll (SSN, bank accounts, salaries), vendor banking details, AR/AP, and general ledger Full customer contract register — exact pricing for all 88 enterprise customers with $20.6M in deferred revenue <redacted> SAP installation media (245 GB) — full HANA, S/4HANA, and kernel distributions <redacted>
Amounts as written
- 705 MB
- 245 GB
Kinds of data mentioned
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Accounting and ledgers
“…company's sole revenue-generating asset ($20.6M backlog) <redacted> Live QuickBooks financial database (705 MB) — complete payroll (SSN, bank accounts, salaries), vendor banking…”
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Banking and wire details
“…<redacted> Live QuickBooks financial database (705 MB) — complete payroll (SSN, bank accounts, salaries), vendor banking details, AR/AP, and general ledger Full customer contract register…”
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Payroll and salaries
“…backlog) <redacted> Live QuickBooks financial database (705 MB) — complete payroll (SSN, bank accounts, salaries), vendor banking details, AR/AP, and general ledger Full customer…”
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Identity documents
“…<redacted> Live QuickBooks financial database (705 MB) — complete payroll (SSN, bank accounts, salaries), vendor banking details, AR/AP, and general ledger Full customer…”
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Customer or client data
“…accounts, salaries), vendor banking details, AR/AP, and general ledger Full customer contract register — exact pricing for all 88 enterprise customers with $20.6M in deferred…”
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Contracts and legal files
“…salaries), vendor banking details, AR/AP, and general ledger Full customer contract register — exact pricing for all 88 enterprise customers with $20.6M in deferred revenue <redacted>…”
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Source code and designs
“The exposed material includes: Complete product source code — all versions (2.0–5.4) of ShipERP's ABAP source, the company's sole revenue-generating asset…”
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Databases and backups
“…revenue-generating asset ($20.6M backlog) <redacted> Live QuickBooks financial database (705 MB) — complete payroll (SSN, bank accounts, salaries), vendor banking details, AR/AP,…”
Plain-English summary AI-written
The group says it holds ShipERP source code, a QuickBooks financial database, customer contract records, and SAP installation materials.
Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with ERPIS (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask ERPIS directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what ERPIS can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data, identity documents.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, payroll and salaries, accounting and ledgers.
- Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: source code and designs, databases and backups.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching ERPIS A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are ERPIS
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: identity documents, customer or client data, payroll and salaries.
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, payroll and salaries, accounting and ledgers.
Within 3 days
- Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: identity documents.
- Rotate secrets and signing keys Assume secrets in repositories are exposed: rotate API keys, tokens and code-signing keys, and review build and release systems for unexpected changes. Why: The post names: source code and designs.
- Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
- Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 705 MB, 245 GB. Treat group figures as unverified.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties No country is recorded for this listing. Identify the data-protection and contractual duties that apply where the affected people live, and ask counsel. General guidance, not legal advice. Why: The listing records no country.
Within 30 days
- Review privileged and contract material Ask counsel which contracts and privileged files are named, and whether client or partner confidentiality terms oblige you to tell them. Why: The post names: contracts and legal files.
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Professional Services organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: aurora listed 4 other Professional Services organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
56/100 • GUARDEDA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceNo scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.
Launch Attack Surface Recon →Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.