American Council of Education was listed on 30 September 2026 by the incransom ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). incransom listed 29 organizations that month and 1041 in total.
- Listed 49 days ago.
- 874 organizations were listed by all groups in September 2026, see the month.
- 41 in Education that month.
- 272 in US that month.
Updated 2026-11-18 11:12 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
American Council of Education
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- INC Ransom 1,041 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
# American Council on Education — Data Breach Disclosure **Published:** September 30, 2026 **Data Publication Date: October 7, 2026** --- > *ACE was given the opportunity to resolve this matter privately. Their leadership engaged in discussions, then chose to walk away without resolution. Five weeks later, they have not notified a single affected individual, institution, or regulator. That decision has consequences.* --- ## About ACE The [American Council on Education](https://www.acenet.edu) (ACE) is the primary coordinating body for U.S. higher education. Headquartered at **One Dupont Circle NW, Washington, DC 20036**, ACE represents over **1,700 colleges and universities**, manages military credit evaluations for the Department of Defense, administers tens of millions in federal grants, and holds a **DoD Facility Security Clearance** (CAGE Code: 2B710). ACE's entire network was compro…
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# American Council on Education — Data Breach Disclosure **Published:** September 30, 2026 **Data Publication Date: October 7, 2026** --- > *ACE was given the opportunity to resolve this matter privately. Their leadership engaged in discussions, then chose to walk away without resolution. Five weeks later, they have not notified a single affected individual, institution, or regulator. That decision has consequences.* --- ## About ACE The [American Council on Education](https://www.acenet.edu) (ACE) is the primary coordinating body for U.S. higher education. Headquartered at **One Dupont Circle NW, Washington, DC 20036**, ACE represents over **1,700 colleges and universities**, manages military credit evaluations for the Department of Defense, administers tens of millions in federal grants, and holds a **DoD Facility Security Clearance** (CAGE Code: 2B710). ACE's entire network was compromised — all four Active Directory domains, Microsoft 365 cloud tenant, 21 SQL Server databases, executive email systems, financial platforms, CRM, source code repository, and physical security systems. **271 GB of data was exfiltrated.** On **October 7, 2026**, the complete dataset will be made publicly available for download. --- ## Table of Contents 1. [Personal Data](#1-personal-data--700000-individuals) 2. [Financial Records](#2-financial-records--117-billion-18-years) 3. [Military & Defense](#3-military--department-of-defense) 4. [Federal Grants](#4-federal-grants--94-million) 5. [Executive Email](#5-executive-email--349000-files) 6. [Source Code & Credentials](#6-source-code--credentials) 7. [CRM & Membership Intelligence](#7-crm--membership-intelligence) 8. [ACE's Choice](#8-aces-choice) 9. [Data Availability — October 7](#9-data-availability--october-7-2026) 10. [File Tree](#10-file-tree--271-gb) 11. [Sample Data](#11-sample-data) --- ## 1. Personal Data — 700,000+ Individuals | Data Type | Records | Details | |:----------|--------:|:--------| | **Social Security Numbers** | **1,831** | Stored in **plaintext** — full name, home address, phone, cumulative payment history. Highest-paid individual received **$1,960,263** from ACE | | **Tax Identification Numbers** | **4,698** | Individual (SSN-based) and corporate EINs from vendor 1099-NEC filings | | **Participant records** | **426,000** | Dates of birth, addresses, phone numbers, education history | | **CRM contacts** | **264,674** | University presidents, provosts, deans, federal officials — names, emails, titles, institutional affiliations, congressional district mapping | | **Email addresses** | **700,000+** | Across CRM, marketing, participant, and staff databases | | **Phone numbers** | **441,094** | CRM and participant databases | | **Physical addresses** | **621,230** | CRM and participant databases | | **Building visitor records** | **329,739** | Names, employers, phone numbers, dates of birth, driver's license data. **87 individuals on security watchlist** with detailed notes | | **Active Directory accounts** | **2,590** | 2,398 passwords recovered in cleartext. All 11 Domain Admin accounts shared the same password | --- ## 2. Financial Records — $1.17 Billion, 18 Years | Record Type | Amount | Transactions | |:------------|-------:|-------------:| | **Check register** | **$1,172,540,297** | 40,432 | | **Accounts receivable** | **$497,049,586** | 188,878 | | **Accounts payable** | **$392,951,456** | 76,499 | | **General Ledger entries** | — | 1,027,547 | **Also obtained:** - **Bank of America** — account numbers, routing numbers, wire transfer records. Master ZBA balance: **$3,659,703**. Routing: `054001204`. ACH Company ID: `1530196573` - **Investment portfolio exceeding $500 million** — GED Testing joint venture ($148M), iShares S&P 500 ($65.7M), Cash Depository ($62.9M), Vanguard ($23.5M), Goldman Sachs ($12.7M) - **Wire transfers** up to **$8.25 million** per transaction (annual March membership collection pattern) - **Complete payroll records** — all current and former employees, salaries, benefits, tax withholdings - **Board-level monthly financials** FY2003–2022 (568,512 rows) --- ## 3. Military & Department of Defense | Data | Details | |:-----|:--------| | **Military Evaluation Database** | 23,755 course evaluations, 3,429 military occupational specialties, 1,849 installations — **70 years of data (1951–present)** | | **Sensitive courses** | **2,472 records** — intelligence, nuclear, cyber, special operations, weapons systems, submarine warfare | | **Foreign installations** | Germany (Vilseck, Grafenwöhr, Munich), Japan (Yokosuka, Atsugi), Korea, Italy (Naples), Spain (Rota), Panama, Philippines (Subic Bay) | | **DoD payments** | **$40.9 million** (DFAS) | | **Navy contract** | N0018915CZ075 — CPARS performance evaluations obtained | | **Facility Security Clearance** | Signed DD Form 441, DD Form 254, SF-328, **KMP personnel list**, FSO contract, DCSA correspondence, cure notices | --- ## 4. Federal Grants — $94+ Million | Source | Amount | Records | |:-------|-------:|:--------| | **USAID** | **$53.6M** | 402 international partnerships, HED program database (11.5M rows) | | **DFAS (DoD)** | **$40.9M** | Military evaluation contracts | | **Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation** | **$10.9M** | Education grants | | **Lumina Foundation** | **$8.6M** | Education grants | | **NIH** | — | 2,464 grant document files | --- ## 5. Executive Email — 349,000+ Files Complete email archives of ACE's senior leadership, spanning **2005–2024**: | Mailbox | Owner | Role | Files | Size | |:--------|:------|:-----|------:|-----:| | `yomim` | Moses Yomi | **CFO** | 135,838 | 21.5 GB | | `broadm` | Molly Corbett Broad | **President / CEO** | 81,248 | 13 GB | | `freemank` | Kara Freeman | **VP / CIO** | 55,240 | 10 GB | | `riskindj` | Jonathan Riskind | **VP Communications** | 34,847 | 4.9 GB | | `hartle` | Terry Hartle | **SVP Government Relations** | 21,732 | 3.2 GB | | `fansmithj` | Jon Fansmith | **Dir. Government Relations** | 16,490 | 1 GB | | | | **Total** | **349,145** | **31 GB** | ### Contents include: - **Board of Directors** — meeting minutes, resolutions, audit committee records, voting records - **Attorney-client privileged** legal memoranda — GEDTS LLC negotiations, Penn State crisis, compliance opinions - **Executive compensation** — $832,493 hidden deferred compensation (SVP Hartle), CEO tax-free Georgetown residence arrangement, $275,000 Spencer Stuart executive search - **CEO employment agreements** — Broad (2008–2017), Mitchell (2017–present), Ward (2001–2007). Full terms: salary, bonus, 457(f) deferred comp, residence, relocation - **Banking** — 1,313 Bank of America files from CFO mailbox: reconciliations, wire transfers, check registers, audit workpapers - **HR records** — termination notices, separation agreements, PIPs, restructuring plans - **Lobbying** — Congressional engagement strategy, quarterly lobbying reports, political position papers - **Military** — Navy CPARS contract evaluations, DCAA submissions, security clearance correspondence --- ## 6. Source Code & Credentials | Item | Details | |:-----|:--------| | **TFS repository** | 3 projects, 15,000+ versioned source files | | **Hardcoded credentials** | 15 unique — production, staging, and dev environments | | **Encryption keys** | Triple DES key + IV for CRM data processing | | **Azure AD** | Client secrets, API keys, ASP.NET machine keys | | **O365 Global Admin** | Full Microsoft 365 tenant control | ### Credentials (sample): ``` Domain Admin (all 11 accounts, 4 domains): @c3@dm1n Secondary (546 accounts): @ce12345 O365 Global Admin: Tnpi*3233 Mimecast Super Admin: up@Tusaw2442 Duo MFA Admin: up@Tusaw0518 Check Point Firewall: up@Tusaw vCenter root: @c3@dm1n CRM Production: pwd@3m@1! SQL Server: BroadPointDidIt! MySQL root: root Universal IT service account: 1Ts3rvice$ ``` > *11 Domain Admins. Same password. Four domains. This is the organization that accredits America's universities.* --- ## 7. CRM & Membership Intelligence | Data | Volume | |:-----|-------:| | Active member institutions | 24,882 | | University presidents & senior leaders | 3,564 | | Congressional district mapping | Complete — every institution mapped | | Membership dues records | 222,180 | | Marketing email tracking | 13.9 million sent records | | "Deleted" contacts (still in DB) | 18,222 (6,751 VIPs) | --- ## 8. ACE's Choice ACE leadership was contacted in **late August 2026**. They were shown proof of access. They understood the scope. They engaged in discussions. **Then they stopped responding.** In five weeks, ACE has not: - ❌ Notified a single affected individual - ❌ Notified any of their 1,700 member institutions - ❌ Filed a report with the U.S. Department of Education - ❌ Reported the FCL compromise to DCSA - ❌ Notified the IRS about 1,831 exposed SSNs - ❌ Filed breach reports with any state Attorney General - ❌ Made any public statement of any kind **1,831 people** have exposed Social Security Numbers and don't know it. **426,000 people** have compromised personal records and don't know it. **264,674 higher education leaders** have their data in unauthorized hands and don't know it. **Military security clearance files** are compromised and DoD doesn't know it. ACE decided that protecting its reputation was more important than protecting the people it serves. **We offered a private resolution. They chose public consequences.** --- ## 9. Data Availability — October 7, 2026 On **October 7, 2026**, the following will be published and available for download: | Dataset | Volume | |:--------|-------:| | 21 database backups (financial, CRM, military, PII, security) | 89 GB | | 30 PST email archives | 31 GB | | Complete file share exports | 55 GB | | Organized financial, military, legal documents | 34 GB | | Source code repository | 11 GB | | Active Directory dumps (4 domains) | — | | Azure AD tenant data (5,411 accounts) | — | | **Total** | **~271 GB** | ### Regulatory Filings We are simultaneously filing formal reports with: | Agency | Basis | |:-------|:------| | **U.S. Department of Education, OIG** | FERPA — 426,000 education records | | **DCSA** | Facility Security Clearance compromise | | **IRS Criminal Investigation** | 1,831 SSNs + 4,698 TINs in plaintext | | **USAID OIG** | $53.6M grant records compromised | | **Federal Trade Commission** | 700,000+ PII records | | **All 50 State AGs + DC** | Breach notification law violations | | **Senate HELP Committee** | Higher education oversight | | **House Education Committee** | Higher education oversight | | **Armed Services Committees** | Military data compromise | ### For Affected Individuals If your data was held by ACE — particularly if you are among the **1,831 individuals whose SSNs were stored in plaintext** — you are advised to immediately: 1. Place a **fraud alert** or **credit freeze** with Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion 2. Monitor financial accounts for unauthorized activity 3. File a complaint with the FTC at [ftc.gov/complaint](https://www.ftc.gov/complaint) 4. Contact ACE and demand an explanation: **(202) 939-9300** --- ## 10. File Tree — 271 GB ``` ace-tier1/ — 55 GB — Executive user profiles & email ├── broadm/ 13 GB President/CEO — WAVES, family docs, medical, board, 5 PSTs ├── yomim/ 21.5 GB CFO — 10 PSTs, Bank of America, deferred comp, IRS 990, payroll ├── HARTLET/ 3.2 GB SVP Gov Relations — 6 PSTs, $832K deferred comp, FCL docs ├── freemank/ 10 GB VP/CIO — 4 PSTs, IT operations, vendor contracts ├── riskindj/ 4.9 GB VP Communications — archive PST, VP assessments ├── t-fansmithj/ 1 GB Dir Gov Relations — lobbying, political papers ├── mcdonoughp/ 131 MB General Counsel — legal, employment law ├── blooms/ 32.9 GB VP Gov Relations — 14.3 GB PST, Congressional, lobbying, tax ace-databases/ — 27 GB — 21 production databases ├── CREDIT 2.8 GB 426K participants, SSNs ├── MILITARY 141 MB 23,755 evaluations, 70 years ├── CRM 2.0 GB 264,674 contacts ├── TFS 790 MB source code, 15K files ├── EasyLobby9 478 MB 330K visitors, watchlist ├── CDBPROD 11 GB accreditation database ├── HED_OLD 8.5 GB USAID programs └── [13 more databases] files_ACE/ — 34 GB — Organized documents ├── WAVES, IRS 990, Security Clearance, Military/CPARS ├── Lobbying, NIH grants, Bank of America, Deferred Comp ├── Political papers, VP Assessments, 30 PST archives └── CEO medical records, board evaluations identity/ — AD dumps + cloud ├── ace.nche.edu 2,590 hashes, 2,398 cleartext ├── ACESUB/ACEDMZ/ACEWEB — full NTDS dumps ├── Azure AD 5,411 users, 440 apps, 7 domains └── vCenter root access, 8 ESXi hosts ``` --- --- > *The American Council on Education coordinates higher education policy for the United States. It evaluates military training. It lobbies Congress. It manages $94 million in assets.* > > *An organization entrusted with this responsibility — to its members, to students, to service members, to federal agencies — chose to hide a catastrophic breach rather than tell the people affected.* > > *Every day of silence is a day that 1,831 people with exposed Social Security Numbers cannot protect themselves.* > > *ACE chose silence. This notification exists because someone had to choose otherwise.*
Amounts as written
- 271 GB
- 2,472 records
- 349,000+ Files
- 21.5 GB
- 13 GB
- 10 GB
- 4.9 GB
- 3.2 GB
Kinds of data mentioned
-
Tax records
“…history. Highest-paid individual received **$1,960,263** from ACE | **Tax Identification Numbers** **4,698** Individual (SSN-based) and corporate EINs from vendor 1099-NEC…”
-
Accounting and ledgers
“…**$497,049,586** 188,878 | **Accounts payable** **$392,951,456** 76,499 | **General Ledger entries** — 1,027,547 **Also obtained:** - **Bank of America** — account numbers, routing…”
-
Banking and wire details
“…1,027,547 **Also obtained:** - **Bank of America** — account numbers, routing numbers, wire transfer records. Master ZBA balance: **$3,659,703**. Routing: `054001204`.…”
-
Payroll and salaries
“…transaction (annual March membership collection pattern) - **Complete payroll records** — all current and former employees, salaries, benefits, tax withholdings - **Board-level…”
-
Identity documents
“…Individuals Data Type Records Details |:----------|--------:|:--------| **Social Security Numbers** **1,831** Stored in **plaintext** — full name, home address, phone, cumulative payment…”
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Passwords and credentials
“…[Executive Email](#5-executive-email--349000-files) 6. [Source Code & Credentials](#6-source-code--credentials) 7. [CRM & Membership Intelligence](#7-crm--membership-intelligence)…”
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Email and communications
“…domains, Microsoft 365 cloud tenant, 21 SQL Server databases, executive email systems, financial platforms, CRM, source code repository, and physical security systems.…”
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Medical or patient records
“…profiles & email ├── broadm/ 13 GB President/CEO — WAVES, family docs, medical, board, 5 PSTs ├── yomim/ 21.5 GB CFO — 10 PSTs, Bank of America, deferred comp, IRS 990,…”
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Customer or client data
“…minutes, resolutions, audit committee records, voting records - **Attorney-client privileged** legal memoranda — GEDTS LLC negotiations, Penn State crisis, compliance opinions…”
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Employee and HR records
“…**Email addresses** **700,000+** Across CRM, marketing, participant, and staff databases | **Phone numbers** **441,094** CRM and participant databases | **Physical addresses**…”
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Contracts and legal files
“…Philippines (Subic Bay) | **DoD payments** **$40.9 million** (DFAS) | **Navy contract** N0018915CZ075 — CPARS performance evaluations obtained | **Facility Security Clearance**…”
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Source code and designs
“…SQL Server databases, executive email systems, financial platforms, CRM, source code repository, and physical security systems. **271 GB of data was exfiltrated.** On **October…”
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Databases and backups
“…compromised — all four Active Directory domains, Microsoft 365 cloud tenant, 21 SQL Server databases, executive email systems, financial platforms, CRM, source code repository,…”
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with American Council of Education (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask American Council of Education directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what American Council of Education can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data, email and communications, passwords and credentials, identity documents, employee and hr records.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, payroll and salaries, accounting and ledgers, tax records.
- Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: source code and designs, databases and backups.
- If you share health data with them You may be the data controller, with notification duties of your own. Ask counsel which health-privacy rules apply to you. Why: The post names medical or health data.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching American Council of Education A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are American Council of Education
First 24 hours
- Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: passwords and credentials, identity documents, email and communications, customer or client data, payroll and salaries.
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, payroll and salaries, accounting and ledgers.
Within 3 days
- Handle health-data exposure Work out which patient or health records are in scope, apply the health-privacy notification rules that cover them, and prepare patient communications. Why: The post names: medical or patient records.
- Support affected individuals Identify the employees or customers whose identity data may be in scope and offer identity-protection or credit monitoring; brief the help desk on likely phishing. Why: The post names: employee and hr records, identity documents.
- Rotate secrets and signing keys Assume secrets in repositories are exposed: rotate API keys, tokens and code-signing keys, and review build and release systems for unexpected changes. Why: The post names: source code and designs.
- Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
- Check for mailbox compromise Audit mailbox rules, forwarding and delegated access, rotate mail-admin credentials and move DMARC to p=reject to limit follow-on phishing. Why: The post names: email and communications.
- Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 271 GB, 2,472 records, 349,000+ Files. Treat group figures as unverified.
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties United States: state breach-notification laws apply; listed companies may also have SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 duties for material incidents, and HIPAA applies to health data. Health data adds sector rules. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: United States.
Within 30 days
- Review privileged and contract material Ask counsel which contracts and privileged files are named, and whether client or partner confidentiality terms oblige you to tell them. Why: The post names: contracts and legal files.
- Watch for tax-filing fraud Tell your tax advisers and, where available, tax authorities so fraudulent filings made with exposed identifiers can be caught early. Why: The post names: tax records.
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Education organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: incransom listed 8 other Education organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
88/100 • CRITICALA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceNo scan has been run for this domain yet, so there are no figures to show. Running one is passive: it reads public DNS and certificate records only.
Launch Attack Surface Recon →Run a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.