Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift
Dashboard / Victims / i2i-systems

i2i-systems was listed on 13 September 2026 by the Barracuda ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). Barracuda listed 4 organizations that month and 18 in total.

  • Listed 67 days ago.
  • 874 organizations were listed by all groups in September 2026, see the month.
  • 141 in Technology that month.
  • 11 in TR that month.

Updated 2026-11-19 05:35 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.

i2i-systems corporate emblem
Listed by Barracuda Disclosed: 2026-09-13 09:20 UTC

i2i-systems

i2i-systems.com Technology TR

Threat Group Post & Evidence

Listed by
Barracuda 18 listings in total

The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.

No capture of the original post

We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.

The group's leak-site address is on paid plans

Free accounts see who listed this organization, when, and what the post claims. The address of the group's own page is shown to license-key holders. If you have a key, see what a license key adds.

What the group says it holds

Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.

This is one of the most poorly secured companies we have ever encountered. Over the course of a week, we analyzed the infrastructure and moved freely across their network. The infrastructure lacked proper security configurations, and the IT department showed a complete disregard for the data. As a result of the attack, 693 gigabytes of data were exfiltrated. We downloaded the complete source code for the following projects: Caplan DataGov-Dev-Docker DDR DDR-Veriskop DFE-Dev Kangal-Dev SDD-DEV-DOCKER SDD-MAIN commonprojects.zip Copycat.zip CopycatLive.zip datacat.war datagov.war Kangal-Dev.zip Kangal-Master.zip [email protected] smartdq.war The volume of exfiltrated source code totaled 44 gigabytes. The data includes a full snapshot of the latest releases from the development repository. i2i-systems has a direct connection to the information security company Veriskop; therefore, this b…
Show the full post (2441 characters)

This is one of the most poorly secured companies we have ever encountered. Over the course of a week, we analyzed the infrastructure and moved freely across their network. The infrastructure lacked proper security configurations, and the IT department showed a complete disregard for the data. As a result of the attack, 693 gigabytes of data were exfiltrated. We downloaded the complete source code for the following projects: Caplan DataGov-Dev-Docker DDR DDR-Veriskop DFE-Dev Kangal-Dev SDD-DEV-DOCKER SDD-MAIN commonprojects.zip Copycat.zip CopycatLive.zip datacat.war datagov.war Kangal-Dev.zip Kangal-Master.zip [email protected] smartdq.war The volume of exfiltrated source code totaled 44 gigabytes. The data includes a full snapshot of the latest releases from the development repository. i2i-systems has a direct connection to the information security company Veriskop; therefore, this breach directly affects them as well. In addition, i2i-systems engaged in joint projects with partners such as Vodafone, Etiya, Bouygues, Freedom Mobile, and others; this is evidenced by the Linux servers located within the i2i-systems infrastructure: 1864654005 backup_Veriskop-SQA1.local_2026-08-31_203808.tar.gz 3292962897 copycat2019.i2isystems.local_critical_backup_2026-08-31_19-30-29.tar.gz 18422354 critical_backup_bouygues_fcbs_batch2.local_20260830_221815.tar.gz 2231188487 etiya-mobile-test-01.local_backup_20260831_213207.tar.gz 20546323810 freedom-mobile1-critical-vault.tar.gz 1050673952 freedom-mobile2-secrets-20260830-232814.tar.gz 721661 maya-redhat7-9_2026-08-30_233036.tar.gz 22966288270 ol8-10-innobi_full_backup_20260831_022640.tar.gz 529695763 veriskop-db-critical-backup-2026-08-31_234418.tar.gz 13012999372 veriskop-fiziksel-yedek-20260831023535.tar.gz 309528511 veriskop-oracle-critical-backup-2026-08-31_203340.tar.gz 633604141 veriskop-rhel-7.local_critical_backup.tar.gz 4878999722 Veriskoptest01.local_backup_20260831_213236.tar.gz 238487575 Veriskoptest02.local_critical_backup_20260831_213052.tar.gz 33936543608 veriskoptest03_critical_backup_2026-08-31.tar.gz We have extracted absolutely all critical data from these infrastructure Linux systems and created a snapshot of the databases. In addition, i2i-systems recently launched a joint project with Turk Telekom—we have downloaded the database containing all their customers. The data will be published soon... | Severity: HIGH | Size: 643 GB | 300000$

Amounts as written

  • 693 gigabytes
  • 44 gigabytes
  • 643 GB

Kinds of data mentioned

  • Customer or client data

    “…with Turk Telekom—we have downloaded the database containing all their customers. The data will be published soon... | Severity: HIGH Size: 643 GB 300000$”

  • Source code and designs

    “…attack, 693 gigabytes of data were exfiltrated. We downloaded the complete source code for the following projects: Caplan DataGov-Dev-Docker DDR DDR-Veriskop DFE-Dev Kangal-Dev…”

  • Databases and backups

    “…ol8-10-innobi_full_backup_20260831_022640.tar.gz 529695763 veriskop-db-critical-backup-2026-08-31_234418.tar.gz 13012999372 veriskop-fiziksel-yedek-20260831023535.tar.gz 309528511…”

Plain-English summary AI-written

The group says it exfiltrated 693 gigabytes of data, including source code for several projects.

Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.

What to do about this listing

Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.

If you work with i2i-systems (customer, supplier or partner)

Within 3 days

  • Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
  • Ask i2i-systems directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
  • Review what i2i-systems can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
  • Expect convincing phishing Messages that quote real orders, invoices or names are more likely after a leak. Tell finance and the help desk to treat any request from, or about, this company with extra care. Why: The post names: customer or client data.
  • Check software and integrations you take from them If you run their software or call their API, check that updates come through the usual channel and rotate the keys and tokens you hold for it. Why: The post names: source code and designs, databases and backups.

Within 30 days

  • Keep watching i2i-systems A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are i2i-systems

First 24 hours

  • Reset credentials and sessions Force password, API-key and session-token resets for the accounts the post suggests were exposed, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and revoke OAuth/SSO grants issued before the listing date. Why: The post names: customer or client data.

Within 3 days

  • Rotate secrets and signing keys Assume secrets in repositories are exposed: rotate API keys, tokens and code-signing keys, and review build and release systems for unexpected changes. Why: The post names: source code and designs.
  • Rotate database and cloud access Rotate database and cloud-storage keys, review public bucket and snapshot sharing, turn on object-level audit logging and keep backup encryption keys separate. Why: The post names: databases and backups.
  • Size the exposure against your own systems Inventory which systems hold data of the kind and volume claimed, so notification and legal decisions rest on your records rather than the group's figures. Why: The post claims: 693 gigabytes, 44 gigabytes, 643 GB. Treat group figures as unverified.
  • Lock down exposed admin, VPN and SSO panels Restrict by IP allow-list or a zero-trust proxy and require MFA. Why: A passive scan found 2 critical panel(s) reachable from the internet.
  • Retire staging and dev exposure Take non-production hosts off the internet or behind authentication, and rotate any secrets they held. Why: A passive scan found 1 non-production host(s) that are public.
  • Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties No country is recorded for this listing. Identify the data-protection and contractual duties that apply where the affected people live, and ask counsel. General guidance, not legal advice. Why: The listing records no country.

Within 30 days

  • Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Technology organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: Barracuda listed 2 other Technology organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
  • Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.

Listing details

Resolved Domain i2i-systems.com
Industry Vertical Technology
Country TR
Enrichment Status ENRICHED

Listing severity score (heuristic)

60/100 • ELEVATED

A heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.

1. Sector Criticality 20/30 pts
Technology and communications
2. Group tier 10/25 pts
Tier 3: all other groups
3. Data Volume & PII Scope 18/25 pts
Larger claim: gigabytes, or business or financial records named in the post
Formula: sector • group tier • data claimed (scaled to 100) Rule-based score

External Attack Surface Profile

ASM Intelligence
99/100 • CRITICAL
Last Audited: 2026-11-14 16:09 UTC Passive Recon
Total Network Assets 11
7 hosts • 4 unique IPs
4 cloud-hosted • 2 SaaS
Subdomain Assets 7
Critical Panels 2 (VPN/Admin/SSO)
Non-Prod / UAT 1 Staging/Dev
SaaS Ecosystem 2 Cloud Apps
Primary CSP Amazon Web Servi
Email Security Grade B (SPF/DMARC)
Open the full attack surface scan →
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Defense Telemetry

Passive DNS
Mail Gateway Google Workspace
DNS Authority Authoritative DNS (com)
Edge CDN / Shield None
SPF Record Configured
DMARC Policy Enforced
Public DNS records only • no port scanning

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