MagicLand was listed on 30 May 2024 by the akira ransomware group (the group's claim; Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not confirmed a breach). akira listed 21 organizations that month and 1678 in total.
- Listed 903 days ago.
- 589 organizations were listed by all groups in May 2024, see the month.
- 11 in Hospitality that month.
- 16 in IT that month.
Updated 2026-11-19 06:31 UTC. Data: public leak-site listings. How we work.
Threat Group Post & Evidence
- Listed by
- Akira 1,678 listings in total
The listing states no data size and no ransom demand.
No capture of the original post
We only show a screenshot when we captured the group's own page ourselves. For this listing we have not, so none is shown.
What the group says it holds
Taken from the group's own post. Ransomware Tracker by ExposureDrift has not seen the data and cannot confirm any of this.
Since its creation, MagicLand has recorded about 3 million unique visitors. In 2014, with 800,000 visitors, Rainbow MagicLand was confirmed as the third theme park in Italy. Within the next few d ays Rainbow MagicLand will be confirmed to cause the leak persona l data: bank information (swift codes, BIC, IBAN), EU ID numbers, accounting and HR files.
Kinds of data mentioned
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Accounting and ledgers
“…persona l data: bank information (swift codes, BIC, IBAN), EU ID numbers, accounting and HR files.”
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Banking and wire details
“…will be confirmed to cause the leak persona l data: bank information (swift codes, BIC, IBAN), EU ID numbers, accounting and HR files.”
Plain-English summary AI-written
The group says it has personal data from Rainbow MagicLand, including bank information, EU ID numbers, accounting files, and human resources files.
Written by an AI model (openai/gpt-6-luna) from the post above. It can contain mistakes: rely on the quote, not the summary.
What to do about this listing
Choose who you are. Each step shows why it appears and, where we have one, its source. General guidance, not legal or incident-response advice.
If you work with MagicLand (customer, supplier or partner)
Within 3 days
- Do not open the group's page or download the data Do not visit the leak site or download files from a listing. Holding stolen data can be unlawful, and the files can carry malware. Wait for the company's own notice. Why: A safety rule for any leak listing.
- Ask MagicLand directly Write to your contact and ask whether your data, or your access to their systems, is in scope, and ask for a written statement. Your contract or data-protection law may oblige them to tell you if your data is affected: check the notification clause. Why: A listing is only the group's claim; the company is the one who can confirm what was taken.
- Review what MagicLand can reach of yours List the accounts, API keys, VPN or SSO connections and shared mailboxes this company has with you. Rotate the keys you gave them and remove access they do not need. Why: Access a supplier holds is how a listing about them can become a problem for you.
- Verify payment-detail changes by phone Confirm any change to bank details or any urgent invoice with a number you already hold, not one in the message. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, accounting and ledgers.
Within 30 days
- Keep watching MagicLand A supplier's listing can change after the first sighting: the group can add data, change the status or publish. Add the company to your supplier list to be told, and check your own domain too. Why: A listing is a moving claim, not a single event. Add to your supplier list Check your own domain
If you are MagicLand
First 24 hours
- Protect payments Tell your bank, verify any change to supplier or payroll bank details by calling a known number, and watch for invoice-fraud emails that use real names and amounts. Why: The post names: banking and wire details, accounting and ledgers.
Within 3 days
- Check regulatory and stakeholder notification duties EU/EEA: GDPR Art. 33 and 34 require notifying the supervisory authority within 72 hours of becoming aware of a personal data breach, and affected people where risk is high. This is general guidance, not legal advice: confirm current rules with counsel. Why: Listing country: Italy.
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Check the ways akira is reported to get in
Check these first; they are how the group is reported to work in general.
- Likely ways in include exploiting SonicWall CVE-2024-40766, stolen VPN credentials, password spraying and flaws in Veeam Backup & Replication. (update of 13 Nov 2025)
Within 30 days
- Check shared suppliers and software List the suppliers and software you share with other Hospitality organizations and ask them whether they were affected. Why: akira listed 3 other Hospitality organization(s) in the last 90 days.
General readiness for any ransomware claim (not about this listing)
- Offline, immutable backups and a restore drill Keep backups outside domain-admin reach and practise a restore; a leak does not remove the risk of re-encryption. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Look for mass file access and unusual outbound transfers Review EDR, proxy and identity logs for bulk reads, archive creation and large uploads to file-sharing services. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
- Phishing-resistant MFA on remote access Enforce MFA on VPN, SSO and admin panels, and retire password-only or SMS-based remote access. Why: General practice for any ransomware claim; not specific to this listing.
Listing details
Listing severity score (heuristic)
91/100 • CRITICALA heuristic built from sector, group, data volume and claim details. It is not evidence that a breach occurred or a measure of harm.
External Attack Surface Profile
ASM IntelligenceRun a free passive scan on your own domain to see what an attacker can see from the outside.